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This research critically analyses reforms undertaken in Zambia‟s water sector. Its main focus 
however, is on the corporatisation of Zambia‟s urban water services. The objective is to apply 
some selected indicators of water services improvement to establish whether the 
commercialisation of urban water services has improved water service delivery. The research 
uses qualitative and quantitative literature and generally relies on secondary data. Therefore, 
it is an exhaustive literature review of the available electronic and hard copy sources. Of 
particular relevance to the research are the National Water and Sanitation Council‟s 
(NWASCO) sector reports, which are comprehensive records of the performance of Zambia‟s 
Commercial Water Utilities (CUs). The significant finding is that the CUs that were 
established as a result of corporatisation have succeeded in marginally improving water 
service delivery in Zambia and this supports the research‟s hypothesis. The main conclusion 
is that while an improvement on some indicators has been recorded there are areas that still 
pose a challenge such as the affordability of water charges. Thus, there is a need for the CUs 
to sustain the improvements achieved in the water sector and improve on the indicators that 
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CHAPTER ONE: Contextual Overview 
1. Introduction 
 
This research is an evaluation of privatisation policies in Zambia. The focus however, is on 
the corporatisation of urban water services in Zambia and whether it has improved water 
service delivery. This chapter sets the context for the research and clarifies the focus and time 
period covered in the research, as well as the overarching research question, research 
methodology and ethics, research limitations and more importantly the indicators of water 
service delivery improvement that will be used in this research. 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
 
In a considerable amount of literature water has been described as a human right, crucial for 
leading a life with human dignity. Access to safe water is also a prerequisite for the 
realisation of other human rights. The World Health Organisation (2003:7) expresses this 
view by arguing that “lack of access to safe water has a major effect on people‟s health. Poor 
health constrains development and poverty alleviation…education.” In fact, according to 
„Maslow‟s hierarchy of needs,‟ “attempts to satisfy the higher order needs of society would 
be pointless; unless and until satisfactory progress has been made towards addressing lower 
order basic needs,” (Moeti and Kalo, 2008:220) such as the need for food, water, shelter and 
clothing. Because of the importance of water, its management and provision should be 
prioritised by all governments. Yet more than 1.1 billion people out of 6 billion worldwide 
are without sufficient access to safe drinking water (UNDP, 2010).  
 
Since the end of World War II, water provision has been primarily a state activity, executed 
by governments in both developed and developing countries through public utilities (also 
known as State Owned Enterprises) (Dovi, 2007:7). However, the recessionary conditions of 
the 1970s led to a water sector crisis in Africa when many suppliers found themselves in a 
financial impasse caused by a decline in government funding of capital expenditure. This was 
exacerbated by low tariffs, low billing, low revenue collections, crumbling water networks 












of the public utilities, governments adopted a neo-liberal model of service delivery known as 
the New Public Management (NPM). The NPM is a marriage of two broad orientations, 
managerialism and private sector involvement. At the centre of the NPM doctrine was the 
critique of state interventionism in public service provision. Initially, the most popular stream 
of the NPM was the involvement of the private sector in the “provision, administration and 
financing of traditional government services” (Baird, 2004:3), broadly referred to as 
privatisation in this research. The underlying assumption of privatisation was that the private 
sector, mainly multinational water companies, will come in and take over public water 
companies (Dovi, 2007:7).  
 
The rationale of privatisation was that the commercial incentives of the private sector would 
lead to increased efficiency and huge gains for both the private operators (profit maximising 
and investment returns) and all services users (access to an expanded and upgraded water 
system). Thus, endorsed by the International Financial Institutions as an international strategy 
of reform, privatisation was implemented in a number of countries and was known as the first 
wave of neo-liberal reform. In developing countries, privatisation was a prerequisite for 
donor funding and debt relief and as such the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
took advantage of these countries and carried out fast paced reforms (Bayliss, 2008).  
 
However, a review of a considerable amount of literature on privatisation reveals that in most 
countries (especially African ones), water privatisation has left detrimental consequences in 
its wake. While most privatisation projects have ensured that water service providers are 
autonomous and uphold commercial principles in order to generate revenue this, however,  
has been outweighed by the demerits which range from the lack of a human face when it 
comes to indigent households that are disconnected for the non-payment of fees; to outbreaks 
of water related diseases due to the absence of water and proper sanitation; through to the 
absence of significant improvements in the number of people with access to safe and 
adequate water (Budds and McGrahan, 2007; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005; Bayliss, 2003). 
Moreover, Balance and Trémolet (2005:1) argue that, countries throughout African, are 
fraught with “a lack of sound legal systems, rampant corruption and national and regional 
conflicts and as such have never been the prime destination for private investments” thus 













However, most privatisation research suggests that over the last decade, water privatisation 
has been in decline. Instead there has been a leaning towards more “home-grown utility 
companies [corporatisation] in the provision of water and sanitation across Africa” (Padfield, 
2008:1). According to Smith (2006:1) corporatisation is gaining impetus as an institutional 
model that promises similar efficiency gains (as privatisation) because it “can permit greater 
state involvement than the privatisation model and in doing so can mitigate the negative 
social risks.” In line with this reasoning is the argument that corporatisation maintains private 
sector principles such as cost-recovery and the commodification of water but is a less 
aggressive model than privatisation (Budds and McGrahan, 2003: 94). Thus, corporatisation 
has been put forward as a model in opposition to full blown privatisation (Earle, 2001:2). 
 
While studies on the performance of corporatised utilities are still emerging, the few that 
have been carried out reveal that the results of water corporatisation in a number of African 
countries have been mixed. A few successes (Burkina Faso and South Africa-Johannesburg) 
have been documented as well as some modest improvements (Kenya and Namibia) (Smith, 
2004; Marin, Fall and Ouibiga, 2010; Magdahl, 2012). A number of scholars have also 
argued that while there has been little empirical evidence in the literature suggesting that the 
results of water corporatisation are that different from those of privatisation, corporatisation 
looks more promising than its predecessor (Bakker and Cameron, 2002; Smith, 2004; 
Chitonge, 2011; Magdahl, 2012).  
 
Therefore, it is against this background that this research investigates whether the 
corporatisation of urban water utilities in Zambia has been successful or not. Specifically, the 
research investigates whether the corporatisation process has improved water service delivery 
and will centre on a case study of urban water services in Zambia. In numerous ways, the 
features of Zambia and its water sector epitomize those of other low income economies in 
Africa with, for instance, “high levels of poverty, limited access to water and a crumbling 
water network in the urban centres” (Dagdeviren 2008:103). For this reason, Zambia‟s 
experience with corporatisation and the lessons related to it will be exceedingly relevant for 














1.2 Focus of the research 
 
The analysis of this research focuses on the “corporatisation” option of the NPM in the water 
sector of Zambia even though both elements (privatisation and corporatisation) have been 
present in the country‟s history of reform. Zambia has been selected because it has embarked 
on initiatives to apply private sector principles in water service provision. The reason for 
choosing “corporatisation” is because it is the only option which is common among water 
service providers in the country. A report by NWASCO (2010:2) reveals that since 2009 
there are about 99% people in the service areas of the eleven Commercial Utilities 
(henceforth CUs) while the remaining areas, (1%) are serviced by six private schemes. 
Notably, the private schemes only provide water to their employees as a fringe benefit. This 
is the crucial distinction between the CUs and private schemes. In this regard, this research 
will base its analysis on the 11 CUs in Zambia.  
 
The water services have been selected because “water is an inimitable constituent of the 
human body and second only to air for any beings‟ existence” (Roantree, 1990:351). Another 
reason for selecting water services is that there is a consensus in literature that water 
corporatisation is a condition set by the IMF and the World Bank among other International 
Financial Institutions, so that developing countries (Zambia inclusive) can have access to 
loans and debt relief (Bayliss and Hall, 2000:1; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005: 180; Mitchell, 
2000:3). Furthermore, while Roantree (1990:178) acknowledges that there are different 
stages involved in making water fit for human consumption, as well as the dimension of 
sanitation which one cannot ignore when discussing water, the focus of this research is 
limited to “piped clean water.”  
1.3 Literature survey 
 
Plenty of literature has flourished on the subject of corporatisation in general but very little 
on its results in the countries where it has been implemented. However, a review of the 
corporatisation literature reveals that it has received both praise and criticism. One thing that 
remains constant however, is the manner in which the debate is polarised irrespective of the 
contexts within which corporatisation occurs. This research is also quick to point out that 
most of the literature and debates on water corporatisation are drawn from the more general 













This research makes use of Magdahl‟s 2012 book, From Privatisation to Corporatisation, 
which is one of the core pieces of recent literature on water service delivery. The book 
outlines the shift in the neo-liberal reform agenda over the past two decades as well as the 
change of heart by the World Bank which has been instrumental in crafting neo-liberal 
service delivery models. This research also makes use of McDonald and Ruiter‟s 2005 book, 
The Age of Commodity: Water Privatisation in Africa, which provides some of the 
definitional and conceptual parameters for corporatisation. This book will also be useful for 
this research as it explores the main ideological, legislative and constitutional matters 
moulding the water corporatisation debate in Africa. In their 2008 book Privatisation and 
Alternate Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: Delivering on Electricity and Water, 
Kate Bayliss and Ben Fine provide a critical overview of the reforms introduced in the water 
and electricity sectors and their impact on development in Sub-Saharan Africa. This book 
unravels some of the traditional arguments presented in support of corporatisation and 
marketization policies while acknowledging reported shifts in orthodoxy, hence its usefulness 
for this research.  
 
At national level, water corporatisation in Zambia has not been widely discussed. A few 
studies however, stand out. Both Anderson (2009) and Mbilima (2007) analyse water utility 
regulation in Zambia and come to the similar conclusion that regulation plays a pivotal role in 
influencing the performance of water utilities. Chitonge (2006; 2011) explores the origins, 
dynamics and implementation of commercialisation of urban water in Zambia, while 
Dagdeviren (2008) assesses water sector commercialisation in terms of cost-recovery levels 
by ten urban water utilities operating in Zambia. Drawing on research on the 
commercialisation of water in the Copperbelt Province of Zambia, Padfield (2008:1) 
identifies inequalities existing in the water and sanitation sector. Meanwhile, Malama and 
Kazimbaya-Senkwe‟s (2004) comparative analysis of the Privatisation of Water and 
Sanitation and Solid Waste Management Services in the City of Kitwe, revealed that water 
sector reforms were internally generated as much as they were externally influenced. 
 
The aforementioned studies are of relevance to this research as they focus on various aspects 
of corporatisation in general and more particularly on urban water corporatisation in Zambia. 
However, they do not provide an in-depth analysis or the empirical evidence of whether 












research. This is coupled with the idea that privatisation in Zambia has had detrimental 
consequences for the country (Musambachime, 1999) and therefore, this research envisages 
that corporatisation would be more successful than its predecessor and consequently have less 
negative corollaries for water service delivery. Further, as already demonstrated there have 
been success stories documented concerning water corporatisation in African countries and as 
such, this research argues that Zambia may not be the exception. Drawing on the 
aforementioned assumptions, this research hypothesises that corporatisation has improved 
water service delivery in Zambia. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
 
The overarching research question in this study is: “Has the corporatisation of urban water 
service improved water service delivery in Zambia?” 
 
1.5 Research objective 
 
The objective of this research is to establish whether corporatisation of urban water services 
has improved water service delivery in Zambia. 
 
1.6 Rationale of the study 
 
This study is mainly undertaken to unearth the value that corporatisation has added to the 
water sector in Zambia. In doing so, it provides greater insights into the factors that determine 
a successful corporatisation and those that inhibit it. This study is particularly relevant to 
Zambia because studies on the operational performance of corporatised water utilities are 
only just emerging. Therefore, this research fills a lacuna in the literature by contributing to 
the body of scholarship on corporatisation of urban water services and acts as a point of 
departure for further research by academics and researchers. Hopefully, the outcomes of this 
research will provide lessons for other countries hoping to go the corporatisation route. More 
specifically, similar (corporatisation) debates are taking place in other service sectors such as 












fiscal and political reforms affecting water (McDonald and Ruiters 2005:2). Hence, there are 
lessons to be learnt from water corporatisation for these other sectors as well and vice versa.  
 
1.7 Key Indicators of safe piped water services improvement 
 
Literature suggests that the improvement of water service delivery can be gauged by 
particular evaluative criteria. However, in the social sciences what makes evaluative criteria 
is often arguable. This is especially true if there are many actors involved. For instance, 
Heyne (2002), states that “every attempt to talk about the success or failure of any process or 
institution raises fundamental questions pertaining to: whose valuations are being used, and 
how shall they be weighted? Success for whom?” In response to this, Klijn (2006: 274) 
argues, “evaluation has to be carried out by some method of weighting the various benefits 
for various actors.” In the case of water provision then, improvement (for the government) 
may be viewed as fulfilling the promises made to the citizenry in terms of access to this basic 
need; for the commercial water utilities it is viewed in terms of profit and efficiency; and for 
the general public it may be viewed in terms of service quality, access and affordability. 
Based on the aforementioned observations the indicators of improved water service delivery 
used in this research are given below: 
 
1.7.1 Reasonable access to improved water services 
 
The first indicator of improved water service delivery is a comparison between the 
percentage of people with “access to piped safe drinking” at the beginning of corporatisation 
and 10 years after its inception in Zambia. Safe water here refers to” piped running water” 
whether in the household or public standpipe away from households since in most urban 
settings a pipe network is the cheapest and most effective means of supplying water.  
 
1.7.2 Efficiency in terms of performance of the water utility 
 
As a concept, there is no consensus on the definition of efficiency. However, in this research 












avoiding wastages (see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000:8). But then again, the use of the word 
efficiency always raises a fundamental question; in the words of Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992:3), efficiency for whom? While this research acknowledges the relevance of this 
predicament, it also recognises literature that suggests that the two most common indicators 
of water efficiency are technical and collection efficiency (Jammal and Jones, 2006:10). The 
former is defined as the “ratio of the volume of water billed to water produced” and the latter 
refers to water charges collected by the water services providers (the ratio of the volume of 
paid-for water to water billed). Efficiency is measured in terms of the reduction of water that 
is wasted commonly known as Unaccounted For Water (UFW) (NWASCO, 2010). 
Furthermore, the number of staff employed per 1000 connections as a result of corporatisation 
initiatives is considered as another indicator of efficiency. 
1.7.3 Cost recovery (profit objective) 
 
A significant number of scholars have argued that the rationale behind commercialisation is 
to achieve cost recovery, i.e. to make a profit. Thus, the profit objective (cost recovery as a 
result of collection efficiency) is an indicator of improved water service delivery for the CUs.  
 
1.7.4 Service quality 
 
Improvement of water service delivery is not confined to issues of accessibility and 
efficiency. The quality of water is equally important. The WHO (2004:12) confirms this by 
stating that “safe drinking water and basic sanitation are indispensible to the preservation of 
human health and consequently life.” Thus, the quality of water serves as a key indicator of 
improved service delivery in this research. Moreover, the hours of supply will be considered 
as another indicator of service quality. While this research acknowledges that customer 
feedback/ratings on the quality of services they receive from these CUs would be most useful 















1.7.5 Affordability and tariffs 
 
While efficiency and effectiveness are emphasised in the provision of water, its affordability 
for the consumers is equally important. Most literature suggests that water and sanitation 
services still remain a privilege of the rich minority whilst the poor majority make do with a 
sub-standard service and often times no service at all (Padfield, 2008:10). Hence this research 
also pays particular attention to the tariff changes that is due to the introduction of 
corporatisation. 
 
It is important to note that the aforementioned indicators can be weighted differently: for 
instance an increase in cost recovery may not necessarily mean an increase in accessibility of 
water. It can be weighted more than accessibility or vice versa.  
 
1.8 Period covered 
 
The period covered for this research is 2001 to 2011 to allow for the comprehensive analysis 
of water sector performance as most water utilities were corporatised only in 2000 and 
beyond. This is despite the fact that Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company was corporatised 
as early as 1989 and Chipata Water and Sewerage Company in 1992. Also, due to the 
absence of accurate and reliable data on the performance of the water utilities prior to the 
corporatisation process, this research only makes use of datasets which have been well 
documented from 2001 onwards. Moreover, the New Public Management reforms (which 
prompted corporatisation) only trickled down and proliferated in Africa in the early 2000s 
and coincide well with the datasets used in this research. 
 
1.9 Methods of Inquiry  
1.9. 1 Research design  
 
A research design is considered the glue that holds all the elements of a study together by 
virtue of it asserting how one intends to carry out their research. To address the research 












quantitative research approaches. The two will complement each other to avoid biases 
associated with each design when conducted in isolation. The literature used in the research is 
of a qualitative nature while the data used is quantitative. The former will quantitatively 
describe and interpret the data.  
 
1.9.2 Research methodology 
 
The study makes use of secondary sources. Hence, it is an exhaustive literature review of 
electronic and hard copy sources. The hard copy sources include books, published and 
unpublished journals, articles, theses, annual reports of water providers and government 
documents and legislation. Electronic sources include the Internet, and other media such as 
newsprint. More importantly, the study makes use of data from National Water and 
Sanitation Council (NWASCO) sector reports, which are comprehensive records of the 
performance of Commercial Water Utilities in Zambia. The data collected will then be 
analysed against the NWASCO benchmarks using statistical analysis, which includes the use 
of graphs and tables to interpret data. 
1.10 Research ethics 
 
This study observes the research ethics of confidentiality and integrity as prescribed by the 
University of Cape Town. To avoid plagiarism, all information will be accurately presented 




One of the limitations of this research is the lack of proper records on management and 
consequently poor availability of data which makes it difficult to gauge the performance of 
the water CUs prior to the corporatisation process. Another limitation is attributed to the 
nature of the data obtained from the annual reports of water utilities which Andrews (2009:6) 
suggests, may be inaccurate or manipulated by CUs in an effort to meet benchmarks. 
However, this is not to say that all information is unreliable. The water sector regulator and 












of integrity and reliability. Besides, it is the only way that an in-depth understanding of 
improved water service delivery may be achieved. Furthermore, due to limited time and 
financial constraints, it was not viable to conduct field studies in Zambia.  
 
1.12 Summary of Chapter 1  
 
Chapter one is a synopsis of the background of the topic under investigation. The chapter has 
also revealed the focus and timeframe for this research as well as the research question, 
research methodology, ethics and limitations.  
 
1.13 Synopsis of the rest of the chapters  
 
The following chapters of this research will include the literature review which will provide 
the theoretical debates surrounding water corporatisation and locating it in Zambia‟s 
historical context. Following this will be an analysis of the 11 CUs and corporatisation in 
terms of the water services improvement indicators mentioned earlier, after which a 

























CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review 
2. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a review of relevant literature on corporatisation. However, it begins by 
presenting a brief overview of the evolution of State Owned Enterprises as providers of 
public goods and services. The chapter proceeds to argue that the purported shortcomings of 
State Owned Enterprises have given rise to the dominance of the neo-liberal models of public 
service delivery under the guise of the New Public Management doctrine. While privatisation 
and its variants has been one of the most attractive streams on the NPM menu, endorsed by 
the International Financial Institutions and implemented in numerous countries, the lens 
through which this research looks at NPM is corporatisation, which stems from the 
managerial approach of NPM and has been gaining popularity as a model for public service 
provision and as an alternative to privatisation in the last decade. After this discussion on the 
NPM, this chapter explores the nature of corporatisation, provides its conceptual parameters 
and argues that the approach is guided by the state and that in developing countries it is a 
precondition for aid from the IFIs. Furthermore, corporatisation is a process that is underlined 
by commercialisation – that is the process of using market forces to transform basic human 
needs such as water into commodities. The results of corporatisation in a few countries are 
also discussed. The chapter ends with examining the common arguments that have been 
mobilised for and against the implementation of corporatisation in the water sector.   
 
2.1 Contextual overview and evolution of State Owned Enterprises 
 
The origin of State Owned Enterprises-henceforth SOEs is rooted in the period following the 
end of World War II. Many governments in Europe and that of the United States embarked 
on nationalisation programmes which involved the establishment of SOEs commonly known 
as „parastatals‟ or „corporations‟ (Friedman, 1980: 61). The establishment of SOEs was 
enshrined in an Act of Congress which labelled them as “revenue generating enterprises 
[solely] owned and controlled by the State” (Van de Walle 1989: 601). The SOEs covered a 













Nationalisation was not a phenomenon unique to the global North. In many African 
countries, the development of nationalisation occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, a decade or 
two later than in the West [but also located in a period of transition] and it “coincided with 
the move towards independence and the dawn of the postcolonial period” (Smith 2004: 377). 
Similar to the nationalisation process in the West, the rationale for establishing SOEs in 
newly independent African nations was to attain “economies of scale, improve the methods 
of production, and implement import substituting industrialisation” (Tangri, 1999:19).  
 
The argument for the creation of SOEs was that the public interest could only be attained and 
protected through a “high degree of public intervention in markets” (Nellis 2005:3). Thus, 
government needed to set up specialised service delivery vehicles outside line departments 
(Smith, 2004:377). It is useful to point out that SOEs are not part of the civil service but 
provide public goods and services. Heymans (1995:437) claims that the process of 
nationalisation in Africa and in the West was driven by an analogous ideology, where the 
state was perceived as the main engine of development. What is also apparent in the literature 
is that both models, placed emphasis on equity as the “underlying motivation for state 
intervention in the provision of collectively consumed goods” (Smith page 2004:377). A 
crucial point to note here is that most African intellectuals (including Presidents) also viewed 
the establishment of SOEs as a response to the manacling claws of economic domination that 
still lingered in newly independent states (Musambachime, 1999). Moreover, for some 
politicians the establishment of SOEs paved the way for the creation of “a patronage 
mechanism to distribute jobs to loyal supporters” (Shirley 1993: 193).  
 
According to Utt (1993:5), SOEs became “an attractive form of economic strategy for 
development” which was widely embraced by developed and developing countries alike, 
leading to their proliferation between the 1960s and 1970s. While the conditions under which 
the SOE sector operated varied from country to country a common trend among them was 
that the SOE sector came to occupy a dominant role in the economy of most countries 
(Smith, 2004:3). Furthermore, despite governments investing a significant amount of public 
funds in the establishment phase of the SOEs, over the years the SOE sector was the recipient 













2.2 State Owned Enterprises fall from grace 
 
However, in practice, a review of the performance of SOEs in both developed and developing 
countries in the 1970s revealed that SOEs generally failed to meet the expectations of their 
creators and funders. Very few countries had the financial muscle to intervene at the level 
required for establishing a welfare model, a factor that impacted negatively on the ability of 
SOEs to function well (Smith, 2004:377). According to Nellis (1986), instead of contributing 
to government revenues, most SOEs (especially in Africa) incurred colossal losses, could not 
cover their operational and maintenance costs and regularly became a burden on already 
strained budgets. In African countries this grew to be an alarming and obvious financial gap-
which attracted the attention of the International Financial Institutions, henceforth IFIs 
(Nellis, 2005:2). Although this was not universally the case, the good performers were 
heavily outnumbered by the bad.  
 
When investigated, the poor performance of SOEs during this epoch was attributed to a 
number of factors. The major one was the existence of conflicting objectives (social versus 
economic). For instance governments “decreed that SOEs operate in a commercial, efficient 
and profitable manner” and simultaneously insisted that they “serve as generators of 
employment, provide goods and services at subsidized prices, hire employees irrespective of 
their competencies and award contracts to state sanctioned suppliers” (Nellis, 2005:3). This 
inevitably culminated in political interference in the operations of the SOEs to the detriment 
of managerial autonomy and efficiency. All this occurred against a background of service 
delivery discontentment and protests by citizens in a number of countries. 
 
Efforts to remedy the problems of the SOEs were first evident in the US in 1976 under the 
Carter Administration, then later in 1979 Britain under the Thatcher government and 
worldwide thereafter, and included the erosion of the welfare capitalist state (Smith, 
2004:377). This gave way to a first wave of neoliberal strategies that were rooted in a critique 
of state interventionism (Brodie, 1995; Jones, 1998). At the centre of the critique was the 
tension between the “ethic of citizenship rights to public provision and the ethic of 
entitlement based on individual achievement” (Pickvance and Preteceille, 1991:216). Of 
particular influence to the reform process was the New Public Management doctrine which 












efforts to reform the SOE sector in the late 1970s took the form of stabilization and Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) as prescribed and orchestrated by the IFIs. The SAPs 
constituted a fundamental policy shift from previous attempts at economic reform in 
developing countries and offered prompt financial help to countries struggling with servicing 
their debts (Simutanyi, 1996:826). However,
 
this help was subject to “satisfying certain 
economic criteria leading to „structural adjustment‟ of an economy (Zawalinska, 2004:4).  
  
2.3 The New Public Management paradigm 
 
The New Public Management acts as a starting point for reforming the SOE sector as it is the 
umbrella under which the neo-liberal agenda was implemented. Despite its extensive use, 
there is no unified definition for the term NPM. According to Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, 
and Pettigrew (1996) this is because it is not one phenomenon or paradigm, but a cluster of 
several. Waine (2004:16) defines the NPM as “a generic term or convenient shorthand used 
in the academic literature to refer to a set of similar administrative doctrines and systematic 
changes which occurred in the organization of public sector services.” Meanwhile, a number 
of academics (Ormond and Loffler, 2006:11; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000:133; Manning, 
2001:297) argue that the NPM should be merely envisioned as a toolbox with many elements; 
from which different countries can choose and implement with a view towards creating 
efficient, effective and economic public institutions/sector.  
 
The NPM has two broad orientations explained by the marriage of two different but related 
schools of thought, „neo-classical economics‟ and „business-type managerialism‟ and its 
overarching philosophy is the supremacy of “private sector principles over those of the public 
sectors” in tandem with the assertion that “the application of such principles” would 
precipitate improvements in the performance of public institutions (Thatcher cited in 
Osborne, 2006: 379; see also Hood, 1991). 
 
The NPM marks a shift from the Traditional model of Public Administration by pointing out 
the supposed deficiencies inherent in the latter and locates the problem in the nature and 
practices of the public sector. In its application, there are a succession of unifying 
characteristics of the NPM aimed at “fine-tuning the organization and practices of the public 












management and service delivery. A dominant theme of the NPM is giving line manager‟s 
greater managerial authority and responsibility (Hood, 1991:4). In line with this is the 
introduction of short-term appointments by contract, which entail hiring people based on 
competition, often from the market and “terminating the contracts of those who do not 
perform” (Cameron, 2009: 926). Another appealing theme of NPM is the use of “explicit 
standards and measurement of performance” for both individuals and organisations (Hood, 
cited in Hughes, 2003: 52). Financial reforms are also central to the NPM. Some of these 
reforms are budgetary, which mark a shift from the traditional line item budgeting towards 
programme specific budgeting (Cameron, 2009: 920). For managers this means more 
financial discretion which in turn means greater control over budgets for which they are held 
accountable.  
 
Another central theme of NPM is its preference for lean, specialized, autonomous 
organisational forms. The crux of this argument is that “rivalry is the key to lower costs and 
better standards” and downsizing the public sector, proliferation of the use of markets, 
competition and contracting out are the vehicles used to achieve this (Hood, 1991:4). This led 
to the introduction of private sector involvement in service provision broadly defined as 
privatisation in this research. Linked to this is the disaggregation of units in the public sector 
with the view towards making them more manageable and efficient commonly known as 
corporatisation. A strong customer focus is another attractive theme of the NPM and it 
exemplifies the notion that citizens are customers and therefore, can challenge the power of 
producers (Hood, 1991:4). In conclusion, the NPM is an extensive dismissal of the 
bureaucratic pillar of traditional public administration. Its tenets have been implemented 
either singularly or in combination in a number of countries as a means of restructuring the 
public service.  
 
2.4 The International Finance Institutions as architects of the neo-liberal reform agenda 
 
It is crucial to note that the neo-liberal reform agenda (via NPM) was dominated and 
proposed by most of the International Finance Institutions (IFIs). Significant actors in this 
regard include the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, regional development banks, 
leading OEDC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries and the 












has in practice been applied extensively in its native Commonwealth habitat, considerable 
literatures suggest that the IFIs took advantage of the need for loan and debt relief of many of 
the African countries since the 1980s and 1990s to increase the pace and the magnitude of 
New Public Management style reforms (Common, 1998:440, Manning, 2001:298, 308).  
 
2.5 The First Wave of Neo-liberal Reform: Privatisation as the model strategy for 
reforming the public sector  
 
While the focus of this research is on corporatisation, a brief discussion on privatisation is 
imperative as it provides a backdrop for the corporatisation model. One tenet of NPM that 
received extensive attention and implementation is privatisation. With the World Bank being 
the foremost proponent and exponent of the privatisation strategy most IFIs, regional finance 
institutions and donor countries closely followed the same strategy. Privatisation thus became 
the predominant international strategy for reform over the last two decades (World Bank 
2004; Goldman 2007; Castro 2008; Magdahl 2012:6-9).  
 
For the purpose of this research privatisation refers to “all possible practical policy options 
designed to promote greater role and involvement of the private sector in the provision, 
administration and/or financing of traditional government services (Baird 2004:3). Thus, 
privatisation is an array of options that can be presented as a spectrum, ranging from the least 
form of private sector involvement (i.e. service contracts) to the most extreme form 
(divesture). However, there are other forms of privatisation which lie in-between the two 
extremes of the spectrum such as (in ascending order), „Management Contracts‟, 
„Affermages/Leases‟, „Concessions‟ and „BOT types.‟  
 
Privatisation also featured in the reformation of urban water services and its magnitude in 
most African countries is evident in table 1. What is also apparent is that the magnitude and 
trend of privatisation initiatives in the water sector increased owing to the IMF/World Bank‟s 
SAPs in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s; a period in which many developing countries needed 















Table 1 : The extent of water privatisation in Africa (as at 2004) 
 
Source: adopted from Hall and Lobina (2006:28) 
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However, it is  crucial to note that privatisation of the SOEs in  Sub-Sahara Africa existed 
before the advent of the SAPs, for example in Cote d‟Ivoire since the 1960s – 20 years before 
the SAPs or NPM (Bayliss, 2000:2), but it swept across many countries through the SAPs in 
1980s and 1990s (Tangri, 1993:38). 
2.6 The demise of the first wave and rise of the second wave of neoliberalism  
 
However, the growing arguments against privatisation (laced with political sensitivity and 
controversy) in the development debate have spurred the shift to a second wave of 
neoliberalism. (Smith, 2004:379). The critiques are based on negative experiences with 
previous water-privatisation projects around the world over the last decade (Magdahl, 2012: 
31). A variety of literature presents widespread evidence that water privatisation projects 
“faced severe challenges in ensuring affordable and accessible services to the poor, for 
instance in Argentina (Loftus and McDonald, 2001), Bolivia (Nickson and Vargas, 2002), 
England (Bakker, 2001), Poland (Moran, 2000) and South Africa (Bakker and Hemson, 2000; 
Smith 2004:379). One of the lessons drawn in reviewing this period is that privatisation 
initiatives were not tailored to local needs. Table 2 below illustrates the discontentment with 
privatisation evident in the withdrawals from water privatisation in Africa.  
 
Table 2 Withdrawals from water privatisations in Africa (as at 2002). 













These failed initiatives are indicative of the growing failures of service delivery options that 
were part of the first wave, and its harsher version, of neoliberalism. The negative social 
consequences ensuing from the problems facing these exhaustive privatisation initiatives 
incited extensive thinking among academics and practitioners on the role of the state in 
making markets more effective (Drache and Boyer, 1995).  One of the lessons drawn in 
reviewing this period is that most governments discovered that the need to regulate the 
private sector was more challenging than providing public services themselves. Furthermore, 
Smith (2004:379) makes the crucial observation that the expectations of privatisation were 
not realistic in the sense that “turning to the private sector is no quick fix for governance 
problems that have been neglected by state authorities for decades.”  
 
2.7 From Privatisation to corporatisation: trajectories in water service provision  
 
Given the shortcomings of the first wave of reforms (privatisation and its variants) there has 
been a development and shift away from privatisation as the dominant strategy towards 
corporatisation of public water services (Magdahl, 2012:6). The latter is also a neoliberal 
reform model. It is useful to point out that while the historical track record is that 
corporatisation is often the first step towards explicit forms of private sector involvement-
privatisation, considerable literature has emerged suggesting that corporatisation was 
regarded by the Global South in the late 1990s as an alternative institutional model to 
privatisation (Smith 2004:375; McDonald & Ruiters 2005, Magdahl, 2012:31). This is not a 
view unique to the global South; in fact the IFIs have been on record for legitimising the shift 
from privatisation to corporatisation.  
 
For instance, the World Bank has been doing some soul searching and acknowledged the 
severity of the consequences that water privatisation brings in its wake. The Institutions‟ 
acceptance that full scale water privatisation is unlikely to be achieved in the near future, has 
in some sense led to the “(re)emergence of a grudging tolerance of the state” (Bayliss, 
2011:74).  However, while the adverse effects of water privatisation have made it difficult to 
overlook its deficiencies and have clearly exposed their inadequacies, its most optimistic 
proponents (World Bank and IMF) have continued to blame internal factors for the failure of 












privatisation but on the other hand they “lay most of the blame on African countries, which 
are accused of either not having the „political will‟ or creating „the enabling environment‟ 
necessary for the successful implementation of the programs” (Hussain and Faruqee 1994; 
Simutanyi, 2006:1). 
 
Remaining constant in the water service delivery debates during both the first and second 
wave of neoliberalism is the leading view that “the private market logic ensures full-cost 
recovery and therefore offers a more efficient method for delivering public services” (Smith 
2004:380). According to Moran (2000:35), corporatisation can “capture many of the 
efficiency gains claimed in the process of privatizing, yet avoiding the political debates that 
accompany such moves.” The subsequent section pays particular attention to conceptualising 
corporatisation in order to highlight how it signifies a second wave of neoliberalism by virtue 
of “utilizing a private sector rationale to transform the public sector” (Smith 2004:380).  
 
2.8 Conceptualising Corporatisation 
 
There are several corporatisation models in the literature including “a corporatised utility, a 
crown corporation or a business unit within a government department (Bakker and Cameron 
2002). Table 3 highlights the variety of institutional (corporatisation) models available in 
water service delivery. 
 
Despite the various corporatisation models, a common thread running through all of them is 
the particular approach to accountability According to Smith (2006:2) “government becomes 
the single client for a publicly owned, yet institutionally separate service provider.” It is 
crucial to point out the corporatisation models adopted by the global North usually strike a 
balance between running the institutions along business lines and retaining public service 
ethos, for example ensuring universal access to low-income users regardless of ability to pay 
(Bakker and Cameron 2002). In the global South, this balance is difficult to achieve for 
countries that have selected corporatisation as the service delivery model as the ability of 
states to adhere to a public service ethos is inhibited by the absence of sufficient financial 
resources and human resource capacity, political will and an adequate demand structure 
(Smith, 2006:2). Thus, cost-recovery objectives tend to dominate the service delivery models 












Table 3 Business models for water supply infrastructure 
 
Source: adopted from Bakker and Cameron (2002) 
 
As a term, corporatisation is often used interchangeably with commercialisation (Smith, 
2005:1). However this research argues that the two are different. According to Nestor and 
Mahboobi (1999:13) corporatisation is defined as the “transformation of State Owned 
Enterprises into full blown commercial companies, subject to private law requirements and 
obligations and having the same legal governance structure as any other commercial entity.” 
Yarrow (1999:23) comes to a similar conclusion and defines corporatisation as a structural 
reform process of “creating an arms-length-service entity that is fully owned and operated by 
the state but which is ring-fenced financially and managerially from other services.” 
Commercialisation on the other hand, is “a process by which market mechanisms and market 
practices are introduced into the operational decision making of a service” (McDonald and 












recovery, competitive bidding, cost-benefit analysis, and performance targeted salaries, ring 
fenced decision making, and demand-driven investments.” Notably, commercialisation takes 
the form of either corporatisation or privatisation. 
 
An equally important concept associated with commercialisation is commodification. The 
latter entails the transformation of goods and services into a commodity (McDonald and 
Ruiters, 2005:17). In the process of commodification, Mannan (2009:14) argues, “natural 
resources are given a price value and assigned proprietorship.” The distinction between 
commercialisation and commodification lies in the formers‟ definition as the introduction of 
commercial principles in the institutions that manage these goods and services 
(commodities).  
 
The ability of a corporatised entity to establish a “working environment for a public 
enterprise that replicates the internal and external conditions of successful private 
enterprises,” (Mannan, 2009:14) is further evident in the manner in which it governed. 
According to NWASCO (2005:7) a corporatised entity is governed by a board of directors, 
although it often remains fully owned by the (local) state usually with an increased number of 
shareholders. 
 
As a form of internal reorganisation, corporatisation involves three major structural shifts to 
manage service delivery. The first is financial ring fencing which entails “all resources 
directly involved in the delivery of a particular service being separated from all other service 
functions” (Smith, 2004:381). For instance, where resources are shared by more than one 
department, (e.g. vehicles, information technology) the ring-fenced unit pays the other unit a 
full-cost fee for the use of those resources. One of the most important changes financial ring-
fencing brings is greater transparency such as accounting whereby all costs and revenues 
related to the service can be clearly identified (Nestor and Mahboobi, 1999:8). This allows 
managers to gain better insights into the areas of losses/gains, costs/surpluses of running a 
service that may have otherwise been hidden in the complex accounting systems of 
centralised public institutions (Smith, 2004:381). According to Nestor and Mahboobi 
(1999:8), this also brings forth the problems related to the financial structure of companies 
and often obliges the state to assume directly certain liabilities, in order to improve this 












corporatisation of German Railroads (DB) in 1995 which resulted in the state taking over 
some DM 70 billion of debts.  
 
Financial ring-fencing also creates a conducive environment for the introduction of 
financially driven performance targets for managers- the second facet of corporatisation. For 
instance line managers are rewarded for achieving cost recoveries or meeting profit targets as 
in the „Managerialist‟ approach to NPM (Smith, 2004). Also in line with this reasoning is the 
introduction of  “market-based remuneration for managers with the aim of attracting „world 
class‟ executives who are expected to pay their way by ensuring that the bottom line is 
positive”(McDonald and Ruiters, 2005:18). The third facet of corporatisation is managerial 
ring fencing which entails the “creation of separate business units managed by appointed 
officials operating at arms‟ length from the municipal authority” (McDonald and Ruiters, 
2005:18). In other words corporatisation enables the separation of policy making from policy 
implementation by virtue of the corporatised entity being managed professionally at arm‟s 
length from the policy and strategies that need to be implemented (Mannan, 2009:14). The 
daily management and long-term planning of the unit is left to the ring-fenced management 
team but the elected officials monitor and evaluate its activities (McDonald and Ruiters, 
2005:18). This ensures insulation from political interference.  
 
 
The rationale behind the creation of commercial utilities, Jones (2001: 219) points out, is to 
dichotomize commercial objectives (e.g. profit motives) from non-commercial objectives 
(e.g. public interest/social) of SOEs. The importance of this separation cannot be 
overemphasised and has two significant implications. On the one hand, it leads to the creation 
of the purchaser-provider divide which Nestor and Mahboobi (1995:7) refer to as “an arm‟s 
length relationship between the state as regulator and the commercial firm as producer of 
goods and services.” On the other hand, they note, this separation begs for a clear 
demarcation between shareholder and regulatory functions within the state. Both arguments 
are very crucial to achieving efficiency and effectiveness in the running of institutions or 














2.9 Corporatisation in Africa: Success or failure? 
 
While studies on the performance of corporatised water utilities are only just emerging, a 
review of the available literature on the experiences of corporatisation in urban areas of 
African countries reveals mixed results.  
 
For instance, corporatisation in Burkina Faso has been recorded as a success. Prior to 1994, 
the provision of urban water supply services was the responsibility of a state-owned utility the 
„Office national de l‟Eau et de l‟Assainissement‟ (ONEA). By the early 1990s ONEA‟s 
performance was typical of inefficient public enterprises, with “household connections 
coverage standing at 24% in urban areas, poor service quality” and ONEA‟s inability to 
expand its network at a rate commensurate with growing demand that came with urban 
expansion (Marin, Fall and Ouibiga, 2010:1) In an effort to improve water service delivery 
ONEA was transformed into a corporate entity, still owned by government, governed by 
private law, with an autonomous board subject to performance contracts with explicit 
operational targets. More importantly, ONEA was permitted to cut off service for the non-
payment of water bills (Marin et al, 2010:1). A review of the performance of ONEA since it 
was corporatised reveals that there has been substantial progress in water service delivery. By 
2008 the household connections coverage stood at 50%, service quality improved; for 
example  there was a reduction in UFW, an increase in the number of service hours and 
increased collection efficiency (Marin et al, 2010:1). However, all this happened against an 
increment in tariffs which enabled ONEA to recover costs. Government refraining from 
interfering in ONEA‟s operations, corporatisation being tailored to local conditions set with 
realistic expectations, the appointment of competent and professional employees, as well as 
the reform process being supported by significant investments are all factors which created a 
conducive environment for successful corporatisation in Burkina Faso (Marin et al, 2010:1).   
 
Unlike Burkina Faso, Namibia has recorded modest results when it comes to corporatisation. 
In 1997, the government of Namibia corporatised the national water service company which 
supplied water to the country‟s local water services. The newly established Namibia Water 
Corporation (NamWater) propelled the reform process by replacing the state subsidy of water 
prices with commercial ventures and cost recovery policies (Magdahl, 2012:48). Like the 












water network for the non-payment of water charges soon followed. However, a number of 
studies carried out to assess the performance of NamWater post-corporatisation revealed that 
corporatisation has led to substantial increase in water charges; during the period 1998 to 
2004, a price hike of 114% was recorded (Bayliss, 2008; LaRRI, 2005). This had negative 
corollaries for the local water service providers who experienced difficulties in “obtaining 
payment from their consumers in poor areas since they could not afford to pay the inflated 
prices” (Magdahl, 2012:48). Consequently, local water service providers had problems 
recovering their costs and consequently accrued debt with NamWater. On account of their 
accumulated debts, NamWater reduced or cut water supply to these service providers and this 
forced the latter to take a harder approach with consumers who failed to pay. As a result of 
this exercise, there has not been a significant increase in the number of people with access to 
water, particularly in a country where unemployment and poverty are widespread (Magdahl, 
2012:48).  
 
In South Africa, corporatisation has been carried out in Johannesburg. The rationale for 
corporatisation was influenced by the macro-economic policy Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) which was introduced in 1996 (Magdahl, 2012:47). GEAR promoted 
tight fiscal control, cut in budgets and the allocation of more responsibilities to city 
authorities. Faced by difficult economic situations and rapidly growing demand as a result of 
increased urbanisation, the city of Johannesburg embarked on corporatisation through the 
establishment of Johannesburg Water to accelerate water service delivery even though the 
World Bank recommended privatisation (Smith 2004). In Johannesburg corporatisation is on 
record as being successful despite the introduction of prepaid meters. There has been an 
improvement in water service delivery on indicators such as accessibility, reduction in UFW 
and hours of supply (Smith, 2006). However, a few studies have pointed out that the success 
of the Johannesburg corporatisation model is partly due to the introduction of the “Operation 
Gcin‟amanzi” introduced in 2003 to ensure that the poor pay for their water consumption and 
do not threaten corporatisation (Magdahl, 2012:47). However it is crucial to point out that 
there is considerable literature and debates on affordability and collections that also reveals 
that the impact of free basic water policy on South Africa has also opened the door to huge 
opportunity costs. While this raises fundamental arguments this is not a debate this research 













Corporatisation has also been carried out in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi with the 
establishment of the Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company in 2004. Notably the 
corporatisation process was supported and funded by the World Bank even though it 
originally supported privatisation (Magdahl, 2012:47). Like in other African countries, the 
underlying process of corporatisation involved the application of commercial principles such 
as cost recovery and service cuts when payment was not forthcoming. However, the years 
following corporatisation have revealed “heavy price hikes, with an average increment of 
over 65 % for the city‟s consumers” (Magdahl, 2012:47).  Given that a large proportion of 
Nairobi‟s population reside in informal settlement areas, with 60 % living under the poverty 
line, in 2007 thousands of consumers were disconnected from the water supply in an effort to 
force them to pay their water-service bills (ADB, PPIAF and WSP, 2009). 
 
From the few case studies above, it is evident that corporatisation has had mixed results in 
African countries where it has been implemented.  
2. 10 Debating water corporatisation  
 
While the contexts and technologies in which corporatisation takes place vary, the debates 
tend to polarise. The following section unravels the arguments mobilised in favour of and 
against corporatisation in the water sector. Notably, the debates on water corporatisation 
range from discussions of the political to the moral as the following section will establish.  
 
2.10.1 Arguments “for” water corporatisation 
a. State Failure  
The most popular argument crafted in favour of corporatisation is often linked to broader 
claims that public utilities that are run on private sector principles (commercial) are more 
efficient than those run on public sector principles (Budds and McGrahan 2003:97). 
According to McDonald and Ruiters (2005:1), proponents of this view argue that 
“governments are corrupt, unaccountable, unimaginative and financially strapped, and unable 
to expend and upgrade water services on their own in a reliable and cost effective manner.” 
While it is not the purpose of this research to investigate the authenticity of these arguments, 
they raise a fundamental point that the most significant reason behind corporatisation in 













The argument for the superiority of private sector principles over those of the public sector is 
located as far back as the early 1990s when privately run utilities were almost non-existent in 
low and middle income countries. The assumption was that public utilities that replicated the 
operational environment of private utilities would be more efficient owing to their 
commercial incentives that would embolden operators to pursue the “highest possible 
efficiency” in a bid to make a return on their investments, reduce possible losses from 
inefficiency and default of payment by customers (Budds and McGrahan, 2003:97). The crux 
of this argument is that efficiency gains were for the benefit of all service users, particularly 
indigents as they too would be connected to the water system as paying customers (Budds 
and McGrahan, 2003:97).   
 
Meanwhile, authors such as Tabarrok (2005:2) point out that in theory, it is problematic to 
commercialise water. He, like Bakker (2003: 328), attributes this to the „natural monopoly‟ 
problems and positive externalities associated with clean water. In practice however, Budds 
and McGrahan (2003:97) argue that it is much easier to commercialise water because 
“publicly run water and sanitation utilities in developing countries have been singularly 
unsuccessful in providing reliable, adequate and quality water supply and sanitation.” 
Proponents of corporatisation share this sentiment and argue that “the market is the panacea 
for social and ecological crisis, including those of the water sector, which cannot be 
addressed by the inadequate and inefficient practices of the state” (Fazel-Ellahi, 2011:4).  
 
State failure is epitomised by the inability of most countries to meet the World Bank/IMFs 
„International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade‟ outlines for the period 1980-1990. This 
declaration required every government in the world to ensure 100% access to safe piped 
water for all citizens in a country (Budds and McGranahan, 2003:91). However, an 
assessment of the countries‟ performances at the end of the stipulated period revealed that 
only a handful of governments, Western ones (UK, USA, Germany, New Zealand and 
Scandinavian countries), achieved almost 100% of water services to all their citizens. 
Meanwhile, governments in developing countries (Africa, Asia and Latin America) lagged 
far behind (WHO/UNICEF, 2006:1). This point is reiterated by the presence of more recent 
data in the 2006 Water Development Report that reveals that parts of the African continent 
are the only places not on track to meet Millennium Development Goal 7C by 2015, which 












in Hunter 2010). In fact, of the ten countries with the least developed water sectors, nations in 
Africa make up seven (Hunter, 2010:1). 
 
However, it would be superficial for this research to ignore the reasons behind state failure in 
the provision of water to its citizens. The reasons advanced are twofold. The first is the lack 
of government capacity which often results in weak performance and low payment for poor 
services (Budds and McGrahan, 2003:91). This point is reiterated by Musambachime 
(1999:18) who argues that in most developing countries, the civil service to which the state 
enterprises were accountable to was “poorly trained and motivated, lacked initiative and was 
slow in decision-making.” In line with this reasoning is also the view that state owned and 
operated utilities are usually subject to political interference and corruption especially at the 
local level, a point which this research will return to later on. All this is despite the colossal 
amounts of international aid and multilateral loans that developing countries have been the 
beneficiary of since the late 1980s.  
 
Then again, the perilous state of public water utilities is attributed in part, to “the absence of 
funds and access to finance in the public sector,” which are required to carry out 
improvement and expansion of services (Budds and McGrahan, 2003:92). In many low- and 
middle-income countries, public sectors have been plagued by indebtedness and other 
financial problems, at least since the 1980s despite the colossal amounts of international aid 
and multilateral loans that developing countries have been the beneficiary of since the late 
1980s. The public sector, especially local level government in most developing countries, 
often does not have access to sources of commercial finance or loans, due to the absence of 
prerequisites such as assets and creditworthiness (Cameron, 2006).    
 
b. Corporatisation reduces political interference 
 
Another argument central to corporatisation is that it reduces political interference. This is 
cemented by the claim that public utilities run by the state (especially in developing nations) 
are prone to higher rates of corruption than corporatised ones (Hunter, 2010: 8). Too often, 
advocates of this view argue that “African governments have been clientelistic and have 
politicized water by appointing friends or constituents to positions of power within this 












“SOEs are exposed to short-term political interventions, struggles for political advantage, and 
the demands of special interest groups.” 
 
 Mwebe (2005:11) also identifies a correlation between public ownership and political 
interference and argues that much of the blame for the poor performance of the public 
enterprises can be attributed to incessant political interference, politicisation of key decisions 
regarding personnel administration and the absence of managerial autonomy. In numerous 
instances, public enterprises have become a vehicle for “political patronage, corruption, 
nepotism, misappropriation of public funds, and certainly an instrument for advancing the 
political and material interests of the ruling parties” (Mwebe, 2005:11). This point relates 
particularly to the material weakness of the bourgeoisie class in African countries. Theobold 
(cited in Cameron, 2006: 3) argues that what often sets apart the African bourgeoisie from 
their Western counterparts is that the former often enters politics or assume positions of 
public responsibility in order to “accumulate capital.” This is reiterated in the fact that there is 
an absence of alternatives and the state apparatus provides political power and a wide range 
of resources and opportunities. In a nutshell, corporatisation can be as costly politically as 
privatisation and the political costs can include job losses, an end to subsidies and privileges, 
or lower prices for suppliers. Thus, its proponents argue that “corporatisation insulates the 
enterprise from inefficient political influences” (Mwebe, 2005:1). 
 
c. Water is an economic good 
 
Over the years there has been growing consensus that water should be re-conceptualised as an 
„economic good‟ which Budds and McGrahan (2003: 95) loosely define as “a good that can 
command a price in a market.” The 1992 Dublin Principles emphasise that “water has an 
economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.” 
That water has become a precious commodity is reiterated in the American magazine, 
Fortune, which holds the view that “water promises to be to the 21
st
 Century what oil was to 
the 20
th
 century: the precious commodity that determines the wealth of nations” (Barlow and 
Clarke, 2002:1). Another common argument in support of water commercialisation is that 
“charging for a resource inevitably leads to the conservation of the said resource as people 












is unlike when the public sector provides scarce consumables for free (or at subsidized 
prices). 
 
2.10.2 Arguments „against‟ corporatisation 
 
The advocacy of corporatisation in water provision has not gone unchallenged. The following 
arguments have been crafted against corporatisation. 
a. Water is a human right  
 
The corporatisation of water is laced with a lot of controversy owing to the nature of water; it 
is an „essential human need,‟ and a „precondition for the realisation of other human rights‟ 
(Marvin and Guy, 1997:21).  Budds and McGrahan (2003:94) assert that, the controversy also 
stems from the argument that “water...is defined as a good to which people have a right, 
regardless of ability to pay.” This view is echoed in voluminous literature which argues at 
great lengths for the decommodification of water (Marvin and Guy, 1997; Bakker 2000; 2002).  
Numerous agreements (e.g. WHO, UN) that most countries have ratified insist that 
governments should take the necessary steps towards the progressive achievement of the right 
of everyone to…“sufficient and safe water for personal and domestic use” (UN, 2006).  
 
 A crucial observation that can be made at this juncture is that, the recognition of sufficient, 
affordable and safe water as a human right in itself does not imply that its provision should be 
solely made by the public sector. Moreover, Budds and McGrahan (2003:95) point out that, 
there are no arguments in the literature that “rule out a role of corporatised utilities” in water 
provision. But perhaps the most contentious issue in the corporatisation debate is the view 
that the application of private sector principles in the provision of water services is largely 
motivated by profit-generating objectives. According to Budds and McGrahan (2003:95) the  
prominent view is that human rights are violated by corporatisation based on the hypothesis 
that corporatisation is typically accompanied by full cost-recovery through user fees. 
Opponents of corporatisation argue that this commodification of water infers that it will be 
sold to the highest bidder, often at the expense of the poor. They maintain that “water has 
important biological and symbolic values beyond the market” (Bond, et al, 2001:4). Drawing 












the only institution to provide water– not private companies or corporations (Roth, 1987:231; 
Tabarrok, 2005:2).  
 
b. The IMF, World Bank and other IFIs as architects of the neo-liberal agenda 
impose water corporatisation on developing countries 
 
The IFIs such as the IMF and the World Bank dogmatically believe that “water 
commercialisation and corporatisation is the proper course of action for developing 
countries” especially African ones (Hunter, 2010:5). The IFIs are guided by a neoliberal 
view, according to which “state abstention from economic protection of citizens‟ economic 
and social welfare is conceived as the foundation of the good society” (Spronk 2010: 160). 
Literature is not short on how the World Bank and IMF have become the primary instruments 
for the implementation of the neo-liberal agenda in developing countries (Simutanyi, 2006:2). 
The “neo-liberal prescriptions” are embodied in the stabilization and Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) as well as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Programs of these 
institutions. The SAPs and HIPC laced with harsh conditionalities, have been used as 
preconditions for foreign aid and debt relief from the IFIs in most developing countries 
(Bayliss, 2002; Budds and McGrahan, 2003:109; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005). Water 
commercialisation has been pushed through as one of the conditionalities in African countries 
and there is a plethora of evidence that substantiates this. An evaluation of the WB and IMFs 
loan documents in over 40 countries, indicated that during the year 2000, IMF loan 
agreements with 12 borrowing countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Ghana and others, 
included water commodification and full-cost recovery as a conditional requirement” and 
partial or full privatisation and corporatisation of water supplies is the vehicle through which 
this was to be attained (Grusky, 2001:3; Mwebe, 2005; Van Overbeke, 2004). Unfortunately, 
most developing countries (especially African ones) have little choice and have grudgingly 
adopted the prescriptions offered by the IFIs for fear of losing out on foreign aid and debt 
relief.   
c. Corporatisation has raised public health concerns in some countries 
 
A crucial point that opponents of water commercialisation raise is the inability of the 












water resulting from service cuts. According to Swatuk (2005:46), the proliferation of 
informal settlements as a result of recent massive influxes of people into urban areas coupled 
with punitive cost recovery policies that are aggressively promoted by corporatised services 
have set the scene for health emergencies such as epidemics of waterborne diseases (like 
cholera, dysentery) in the absence of proper water and sanitation. For instance, household 
disconnections for the non-payment of water charges led to an outbreak of cholera in 
Grootboom, in South Africa‟s Kwa-Zulu Natal province in 2001 (Flynn and Chirwa, 
2005:72). This has also been evident in Cape Town and Durban, two South African cities, 
where the “commercial ventures and the stringent cost-recovery mechanisms” employed by 
the public water service provider for the cities culminated in “massive crisis in service cut-
offs, jeopardizing the potential for millions of low income households to lead healthy and 
productive lives (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005). For the same reasons as above, in early 1999, 
Harare experienced a cholera outbreak (Mate, 2005:229). 
 
Public health concerns as a result of commercial objectives and cost recovery mechanisms 
are not a situation unique to African countries. In the UK, following an outbreak of dysentery 
in the city of Birmingham in 1998, “the court outlawed the use of water meters or any other 
instrument that may cut-off the water supply from the consumer, irrespective of the 
circumstances” (Citizen, 2002:1). These instruments were later declared illegal under the 
U.K. Water Act 1998 (Ngwane, 2004:3). However, this research argues that the negative 
effects of water commercialisation and increased pricing are more severe in developing 
countries than developed ones, because access to water supply is closely linked with income 
and public health, particularly for underprivileged groups.  
d. Corporatisation leads to monopoly in public service provision 
 
One of the motivations for corporatisation is the claim that the state monopolised service 
provision, and as a result was ineffective and inefficient in service delivery. Minogue, 
1998:21). As Hughes (2003) argues, corporatisation breeds competition which provides the 
incentive for both lowering costs and improving quality. In a competitive environment, 
utilities have to effectively meet the needs of their customers; otherwise “customers will 
show their dissatisfaction by withdrawing their patronage from one supplier and taking it to 
another” (O‟Connor and Sacco, 1993:5). This argument definitely establishes that this type of 












by offering similar or better quality of services within the same market environment 
(O‟Connor and Sacco, 1993:5). However, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2003:2) raise the 
fundamental point that for the water sector “the target market in many African countries 
(Southern ones) is very small for more than one supplier. Besides, it is difficult to have rival 
supply or competition as a result of the nature of water provision, for instance it is 
problematic if not impossible for one service area to have more than one piped water 
network. Hence monopoly is in some sense inevitable even under corporatisation.  
2.11 Summary of Chapter 2 
 
This chapter has dealt with the evolution of SOEs and the emergence of the neo-liberal 
agenda through the application of the NPM doctrine as a result of the purported failures in 
SOEs. It has illustrated how the reformation of the public service took two phases; the first 
phase which is widely associated with the proliferation of privatisation as an international 
reform strategy. This chapter also establishes that the World Bank and IMF have been in the 
forefront of promoting privatisation and imposed it on most African countries in exchange for 
debt relief and aid. The SAPs and HIPC programs since the late 1980s are the avenues which 
they have used to achieve this in Africa. However, the widespread failure recorded in 
privatisation projects across the world led to the rise of the second phase of reforms which is 
synonymous with corporatisation. The promotion of corporatisation is attributed to a variety 
of reasons such as state failure in water service provision, low levels of investments in the 
water sector and the need to classify water as an economic good, to mention a few. This view 
has not gone unchallenged and opponents of corporatisation have argued that it lacks a 
human face and raise the concern that despite being a human right and essential to the 
preservation of life, water will only be provided to the highest bidder and consequently 
corporatisation marginalises the poor. It has also been documented that water corporatisation 
has led to public health crises such as cholera in areas where adequate water is lacking as a 
result of disconnection from the water network for the non-payment of fees. However, it is 
important to note that a consistent critique of water corporatisation infers a retreat to public 
service provision and while this research acknowledges the shortcomings of water 


















This chapter provides the background of corporatisation in Zambia. It begins with an 
overview of Zambia‟s background, particularly State Owned Enterprises, and proceeds to 
expound the challenges that spawned the introduction of commercialisation in the country‟s 
water sector.  
 
3.1 Background of Zambia 
 
Like many African countries, Zambia‟s transition from colonialism to self-rule in 1964 
beamed with promise. At the time of independence, Zambia was a middle-income country. 
“Born with a copper spoon in its mouth,” the production and export of copper formed the 
backbone of the economy (Dagdeviren, 2008:1). However, continuing foreign economic 
domination and “relatively absent local [indigenous] participation and entrepreneurship” 
were a politically volatile issue for the Zambian leadership (Musambachime (1999:15). 
According to the party of liberation, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), efforts 
to redress this included pursuing a programme of nationalisation.   
 
3.2 Nationalisation and the establishment of State Owned Enterprises  
 
The nationalisation of industries in Zambia involved “the state taking over the physical or 
financial assets found within its geographical boundaries from private enterprises, either 
domestically or foreign owned” (Burdette (1977:472). Thus, the establishment of State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) became the vehicle through which Zambia‟s nationalisation 
programme was to be achieved. The benefits associated with nationalisation included 
awarding the indigenous Zambian peoples the opportunity to participate in the economy 
(through the government). It was also felt that in the long term, a large private sector which 
had been established under the auspices of a colonial administration could not be trusted to 












more aligned with Marxist thinking, was the assertion that government‟s interventionist role 
was the best and surest way to accelerate economic growth (Musambachime, 1999:16). This 
point resonates well with President Kaunda‟s Towards complete independence Matero speech 
in 1969, where he voiced that “political independence without economic independence [was] 
meaningless” (Musambachime, 1999:16).  
 
Armed with the above philosophy, in 1968 the UNIP government embarked on the 
“Mulungushi economic reforms” and thereby creating SOEs; by the mid-1970s most of the 
main enterprises in the economy were under state ownership (Craig, 2000: 357). The mining 
industry did not escape the euphoria of nationalisation; in fact, it was the target of the second 
wave of reforms that commenced in 1969 which led to the Zambian government acquiring 
majority holdings in the mining industry by 1970 (Walters, 2010). The only thing which 
distinguished the copper companies from the other industries in Zambia, which were also 
nationalised, was the dominance of the mining industry as an earner of government revenue 
and major source of foreign exchange for the country (Libby and Woakes, 1980:34). The 
third and fourth reforms followed in the mid-1970s, with the former related to the formation 
of a government-owned bank and the latter related to a take-over of building societies and 
insurance companies (Musambachime, 1999:16).  
 
The SOEs were governed by a board of directors and chief executive director (CED) but their 
appointment was political as it was a prerogative of the President (Kenneth Kaunda).  
“Appointments were a reflection of the loyalty of individuals to the president and the ruling 
party” (Musambachime, 1999:17) as is evidenced by the high turn-over in the appointment 
and dismissal of Chief Executive Directors often without prior consultation of the board of 
directors. Budgetary/financial and recruitment decisions were also made at the discretion of 
the politicians who sat on the boards of the SOEs and sometimes overruled by the President 
himself. Suffice to say then, the SOEs lacked autonomy, be it administrative or financial.  
 
The SOE sector achieved rapid growth and came to occupy a central position in the national 
economy (about 80%), accounting for over 50% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) 
per annum and one third of the workers in the formal wage employment (about 30-40% of the 
total labour force) between 1973 and 1979 (Musambachime, 1999:16). “The copper mining 












government revenue and at least 20% of total formal sector employment” in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s (Simutanyi, 2008:1).  
 
However, in the early 1980s the performance of the SOE sector proved to be unsatisfactory 
and faced numerous constraints such as low profitability, colossal indebtedness and 
underinvestment (Musambachime, 1999:16). For instance, by 1985 the SOEs were 
contributing about 35% to the GDP, but expended 56% of the domestic investment and 
accounted for 13% of the country‟s external debt. According to the Zambia Privatisation 
Agency (1995:7) the situation worsened between 1985 and 1989 when the SOEs cost 
“US$455 million in hidden subsidies [in line with governments socialist agenda] against 
dividends of just US$22 million” (Musambachime, 1999:16) Other failures associated with 
the SOEs included the creation of unfair monopoly of services as a result of operating in 
sheltered markets, overstaffing, subjectivity to political interference, widespread corruption 
and nepotism, and their being used as a cloak for business elites to accumulate wealth 
through links to state capitalism (Simutanyi, 2008).  
 
Opponents of nationalisation argue that “such results are the inevitable consequence of state 
ownership‟‟ (Craig, 2000:357). However, considerable literature suggests that more concrete 
problems can be noted which justifies in large part, the experience of Zambia during this 
epoch. For instance, Zambia‟s nationalisation programme was ill-timed because it coincided 
with developments on the international stage such as the unprecedented increases in oil prices 
and decline in international copper prices; global prices of commodities were being dictated 
by the dominating Western capitalist nations (Burdette, 1977; Simutanyi, 1996). The latter 
was especially harmful for a country with such a high dependency on copper and was 
“exacerbated by the fact that government believed that prices would soon rebound” (Walters, 
2010). This forced the government to treat the mining industry as a “cash cow” and borrow 
extensively to maintain its social expenditure with the negative corollary of increased 
indebtedness. 
 
3.3 Reforming Zambia‟s State Owned Enterprise Sector: the beginnings of privatisation  
 
The above-mentioned crises created a conducive environment for President Kaunda to 












Structural Adjustment Programme with the view of stabilising and restructuring the economy 
in 1983 (Cocq, 2005: 241). Also high on the agenda was resuscitating the SOEs via subsidies. 
However, the IFIs had other plans, in exchange for assistance and debt relief, Zambia had to 
accede to harsh conditionalities including the devaluation of the kwacha, trade liberalisation, 
cut-backs in social expenditure, cancellations on food and fertiliser subsidies, reduction of the 
labour force, a general wage freeze and the lifting of price controls on commodities and 
inputs (Simutanyi, 2008: 2). This had negative corollaries for the already ailing SOEs and by 
the late 1980s most SOEs were run down.   
 
The overall effect of the SAPS was felt by Zambia‟s inability to finance social welfare 
programmes, such as education and health. In addition, people‟s living standards deteriorated; 
the cost of living escalated due to inflation and the prices for essential commodities like the 
staple maize meal skyrocketed, forcing urban dwellers to protest through demonstrations and 
riots in December 1986 (Simutanyi, 1996: 827). All this was done against and fuelled by a 
background of a one-party participatory democracy as President Kaunda had banned all 
parties except UNIP earlier in 1972 (Burdette, 1988:62). Burdened with the widespread 
display of discontent with the SAPS, along with pressure from labour, manufacturers and 
UNIP leaders, a desperate President Kaunda cancelled the IMF agreement on in 1987 (Cocq, 
2008: 241). It was replaced by the interim New Economic Recovery Programme in 1988 
which reintroduced pre-1982 controls such as price controls and subsidies based on the 
premise that the “IMF programme had brought pain, malnutrition and death to the people of 
Zambia ” (Simutanyi, 1996: 827).  
 
The subsidies dished out to SOEs during this period temporarily boosted the performance of 
the SOEs. However, this was short-lived. In the early 1990s President Kaunda was forced to 
make a major policy volte-face and announced the government‟s intention to partially 
privatise the SOEs (Walters, 2010). This was impelled partly by the crumbling of the Soviet 
Union which threatened his authoritarian regime and the third wave of democratisation 
sweeping across the globe in the 1990s (Simutanyi, 1996). More importantly, this move was 
prompted by the poor performance of the SOEs and the colossal debts the country had 
accrued as a result of subsidising them. Added to this was the collapse of Zambia‟s economy 
and increased discontent with the Kaunda regime. In 1991 Kaunda called for multi-party 












party Democracy (MMD) government with Frederick Chiluba inaugurated as President 
(Musambachime, 1999:16).  
 
Once in office, the MMD proceeded with a more rigorous implementation of the 1989 
adjustment agreement signed with the IMF and in line with their party ideology, embarked on 
an aggressive programme aimed at liberalising, restructuring and resuscitating the economy 
“by focusing on the engine of growth being through private initiative and private sector 
development” (MMD, 1993; Cocq, 2005: 42). Driven by this neo-liberal agenda and taking 
advantage of the early euphoria of its victory the party pushed through fast-paced reforms 
(Cocq, 2005:46). Exchange controls were removed; major cuts were made to public 
expenditure and the public service was restructured.  
 
A reform that was particularly outstanding was the adoption of the Privatisation Act of 1992 
(or Act Number 21 of 1992) which provided for the privatisation (divesture) of most SOEs. 
Efforts to privatise Zambia‟s SOEs began under the UNIP era but gained impetus in the 
MMD government). Privatisation was taken up with great fervour such that between 1993 
and 1998 more than 250 SOEs representing 85% of the Zambian economy was privatised 
(this led to a substantial reduction in government expenditure) (Larmer, 2005:5). This 
included the privatisation of the “golden goose,” the mining conglomerate Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), as it was claimed there were no cows to be sacrificed 
in the privatisation process (Simutanyi, 2008:3).   
 
The Zambian privatisation story has been praised in many quarters with the most influential 
assessment coming from the World Bank. In their opinion, Zambia‟s privatisation 
programme was the „most successful‟ and provided many examples of „best practice‟ that 
should be emulated by other countries. According to White and Bhatia (1998:4), “despite 
Zambia‟s small size it outperformed other countries pursuing privatisation policies” and late 
President Chiluba has been on record as stating that “privatisation was an essential feature of 
Zambia‟s economic recovery (Musambachime, 1999:7). 
 
Along with this positive version of the Zambian privatisation process is a conflicting version 
which depicts the programme as a deeply flawed process. Craig (2000: 361) points out that 
this second version has been more influential locally and among academics and NGOs in 












critics regard privatisation as a deliberate move by the World Bank, IMF and donor agencies 
to “roll back” the achievements of the public sector such as bridging the class cleavages 
created by the colonial era and government‟s social responsibility to provide subsidised 
services like water (Musambachime, 1999:25). According to Craig (2000:363) the 
privatisation process in Zambia simultaneously created the conditions for re-colonisation of 
the economy by foreign capital and concentrated local capital accumulation and political 
power. Szeftel (1982:2000) confirms this when he states that the levels of investment and 
technical expertise required to manage these enterprises were beyond the reach of the 
indigenous business class, while the political elite did everything in their power to gain direct 
ownership of productive assets. The World Bank itself conceded that Zambian citizens 
account for only 5% of the privatisation sales (Cocq, 2005:243). This had subsequently led to 
a loss of control of key industries to foreign control and management, which Musambachime 
(1999: 26) argues, threatens the national security and sovereignty of a country- as a result 
Zambia became a dumping ground for mediocre products subsidised by multinationals which 
did not embrace local products. However, Cocq (2005: 243) points out that the Zambian 
government under the leadership of President Mwanawasa became more cautious of 
wholesale privatisation, stressing instead the role of „private sector participation‟ and 
„partnerships.  
 
A disparate collection of interests have also been opposed to privatisation. Both opposition 
parties and members of the MMD party itself have criticised the privatisation process on the 
premise that it was not transparent (Craig 2000: 363). This is in contrast with the evidence 
revealed in White and Bhatia‟s (1998:156) study which noted that “Zambia was the one 
country in which not one interview revealed any concern about the transparency of the 
[privatisation] process.” The labour movement‟s dissatisfaction with privatisation is evident 
in their authorisation of a massive strike in 2004 (Times of Zambia, 2002). Several 
indigenous NGOs have also been critical of privatisation. For the most part they have rejected 
the idea of privatisation and condemned any relationship with the World Bank and IMF, 
blaming it for the escalation of unemployment, while others have merely pointed to problems 
of process. However, Cocq (2005:244) makes the fundamental observation that the debate 
around privatisation has largely been “limited to questions of who gets to dictate private 
sector-led development (the government or the World Bank), rather than whether private 













3.4 Zambia‟s water sector reforms and corporatisation 
 
While Privatisation has been the common method of the NPM reform for most of Zambia‟s 
SOEs (under the MMD rule), it has not been the case for the water services sector. Zambia‟s 
water sector has undergone tremendous transformation over the years. This section of the 
research will outline some of the legislative, institutional and financial moves that have 
shaped the landscape of the country‟s water sector since the early 1990s.  
 
Prior to the 1990s, the provision of water and sanitation services was the responsibility of 
municipal authorities but the infrastructure was owned and maintained by central government 
(Chitonge, 2006: 2). On the Copperbelt province, a different arrangement existed where 
ZCCM owned and ran the water network and supplied water to the mines, its employees and 
other residents in the mine townships (Dagdeviren, 2000). Water tariffs in all the urban 
centres of Zambia were heavily subsidized by the government with charges paid as part of 
housing rentals (consumers did not get separate water bills for water consumed every month).  
 
From the late 1980s, economic decline took a toll on essential services including water 
supply. The crisis in the sector deepened with Municipal companies facing financial 
constraints brought about by poor revenue collection and low billing, exacerbated by years of 
dwindling government funding as a result of the recessionary conditions of the 1970s (Cocq, 
2005:244).  This meant that water service provision could not be extended to meet the 
increased demand. The crumbling infrastructure further led to excessive losses in terms of 
leakages and became difficult for municipals to achieve cost recovery (Senkwe, 1999). 
Adding to this plethora of deficiencies was the country‟s institutional set-up which was 
poorly coordinated, resulting in the “duplication of duties and tension between the various 
ministries over roles and jurisdictions” (Chola, 2003:17). It is as a result of and as panacea to 
this situation that the reforms in Zambia‟s water sector commenced.  
a. Legislative changes 
 
The most monumental legislative reform in Zambia‟s water sector was the adoption of the 
National Water Policy (NWP) in 1994 which formed the cornerstone of the water sector 
reform by stipulating the guiding principles for the reform process. Seven principles were 













 The separation of water resources functions between water supply and sanitation;  
 separation of regulatory and executive functions within the water supply and sanitation sector; 
 devolution of authority to local authorities and private enterprises;  
 achievement of full cost recovery for water supply and sanitation services (capital recovery, operation 
and maintenance) through user charges in the long run;  
 Human resources development leading to more effective institutions; 
 appropriate to local conditions;  
 and increased government spending in the water sector.  
 
The most notable transformation introduced through this policy was the reclassification of 
water (from a social good to an economic good), the embracing of full cost recovery and the 
corporatisation of all of Zambia‟s water utilities (NWP, 1994:28). Another policy introduced 
was the Water Supply and Sanitation Act No. 28 of 1997, which made provision for the 
creation of a national regulator in the water sector i.e. NWASCO (GRZ, 2000). This is 
discussed in further detail under institutional changes.  
 
Zambia‟s water sector reforms where implemented in three phases as the following table 
illustrates. 
Table 4 Phases of water sector reforms in Zambia 
 












b. Institutional changes 
 
While the general mood towards improving the performance of SOEs was full privatisation 
and even though the 1997 Water and Sanitation Act permitted it (and public private 
partnerships), it did not feature in reforming the water sector. Instead Zambia adopted 
corporatisation because of the detrimental consequences of full privatisation that the country 
was still nursing. Further, the privatised utilities were still associated with sluggish 
performance and poor service delivery. Added to this was negative experiences that had been 
documented in most African countries regarding water privatisation and as a result “no 
private sector investors were willing to invest in the water sector” in the early 2000s 
(Chitonge, 2010:14). The closest Zambia came to involving the private sector in water 
service provision was the management Contract awarded to the AHC in the mining towns of 
the Copperbelt
1
 from 2000-2005. The World Bank facilitated this through a loan to the 
Zambian government but the contract was cancelled in 2005 on the grounds that it did not 
outperform the public utilities. Hence the service was transferred to another public utility on 
that Province, Nkana Water and Sewerage Company (Dagdeviren, 2000).  
 
Armed with the philosophy that corporatisation in the water sector would achieve cost 
recovery, improve access to water, increase accountability and encourage the responsible use 
of water by consumers, Zambia began corporatizing its water services rigorously in 2000 and 
by 2009 the country had successfully corporatised all of its Water Utilities (11 in total) 
(NWASCO, 2010:5). The exceptions were Lusaka WSC and Eastern WSC which had been 
corporatised in a pilot project earlier in 1989 and 1992, respectively (Dagdeviren, 2000).  
 
In the Zambian case, CUs are operated as separate commercial entities registered under the 
Companies Act and “regulated by private company law and not public law or statutes” 
(Chitonge, 2007; 2011:5). These Commercial Utilities have regional or provincial monopoly 
in water supply and distribution, for instance, each province has a CU except for the 
Copperbelt which has 3 CUs, which all operate in different territories. The CUs have Boards 
and a management which is competitively recruited from the market by the former. So all 
processes are handled just like private companies (i.e. financial and budgetary oversight, 
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strategic plans, etc. lies in the hands of management). As for the Boards, each CU has a 10 
member board. The members are nominated by the municipal councils who are the 
shareholders in the Water Service Companies, accountable to the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing (Dagdeviren, 2000). The composition of the Board is prescribed by 
the said ministry, a cross section of members and two appointed by the Minister. CUs 
(Management) report to the Boards who, in turn, are accountable to the shareholders who are 
accountable to government (Mbilima, 2012). 
 
Since the proliferation of corporatisation in 2000 in Zambia, donor agencies have been the 
major source of funding to the water sector and accordingly have come to bear immense clout 
and influence in “policy formulation and choice in programmes” (Chitonge, 2011). This point 
is reiterated in a country report by the Water Aid (WAZ, 2009) which indicated that the state 
contributes only 10% of the overall funding to the water sector while donors still provide 
90%. Figure 1 illustrates some of the institutional changes that took place during the 


































Source: NWASCO ( 2010) 
 


























Table 5 Profile of Commercial Water Utilities in Zambia 
 
Source: Adapted from 2010 NWASCO sector report, pg. 3 
 
 
It is important to note that despite some CUs servicing a large number of towns, it does not 
necessarily mean that they cover a wider population. On the contrary, CUs like Lusaka WSC, 
Kafubu WSC and Nkana WSC (which only service 4, 3 and 3 towns respectively) are known 
as the „Big Seals‟ because they service large numbers of Zambia‟s population. Figure 2 





















Figure 2: Geographic Location of Water and Sewerage Companies (WSC) or CUs 
 
Adapted from Chitonge (2011:7) 
 
Further, the Commercial Utilities in Zambia have adopted the following CU Business Model.  
 
Figure 3: Zambia‟s Commercial Utility Business Model 
 












According to Figure 3, a CU has a unique relationship with each actor in the water sector. For 
instance, a CU is obliged to pay its taxes to government which is the creator of legislation all 
CUs conform to. The latter has agreements with donors concerning funding for rehabilitation, 
equipment and advice to the CUs. Government also acts on the advice of the regulator and 
the latter ensures that CUs adhere to regulations and guidelines such as licensing and 
compliance with service delivery benchmarks. Meanwhile, the CUs remit fees to the 
regulator in addition to data indicating their performance. The regulator also acts as the 
protector of consumer rights, by virtue of the consumer providing the CUs with revenue in 
exchange for water services. The CU is obliged to deliver local government services and is 
accountable to the shareholders who enjoy the dividends from the CU. To enable the 
operation of the CU, labour is needed in the form of employees who are remunerated for their 
services. A similar arrangement is also seen from suppliers who provide goods and services 
to the CUs who in turn pay for such services. The clear roles of each actor mentioned above 
are what propel commercialisation.  
 
Another fundamental change prompted by the reform process was the establishment of the 
water sector regulator NWASCO in 2000 as provided for by the Water Supply and Sanitation 
Act No.28 of 1997. NWASCO‟s major role is to act as a watchdog in Zambia‟s water sector. 
Its full range of responsibilities includes “developing guidelines for service provision, tariff 
setting, and for the establishment to licensing and monitoring of commercial utilities” 
(NWASCO, 2000). NWASCO is also mandated by law to create and manage a Devolution 
Trust Fund (DTF) that will provide grants to support utilities with commercialisation. 
NWASCO is not only tasked with ensuring government policy is implemented but also 
ensuring the withdrawal of the state (both national and local) from direct involvement in 
water service provision. This is a trend not unique to Zambia.  The withdrawal of the state 
from public service provision is a global approach which has been supported by conventional 
economic policy and promoted by donors and international development agencies since the 
early 1980s (Bayliss and McKinley, 2007; Chitonge, 2010). 
 
The organogram of NWASCO is occupied by representatives from specific government 
ministries as well as  “the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Environmental Council, 
the Consumer Protective Agency, the Competition Commission, members of the private 
sector and from the public, all of whom are appointed by the Minister of Local Government 












the interests of the consumers on board and monitor service provision, NWASCO has 
established community based and Water Watch Groups (NWASCO 2002). It is also crucial to 
point out that the presence of NWASCO has facilitated the collection of data on the 
performance of the 11 CUs in light of the poor records of management at the start of the 
commercialisation process. Further, NWASCO, through regulation, seeks to emulate the 
effects of competition.  This is despite claims that NWASCOs regulatory strength is 
compromised by virtue of its financial viability being dependent on the licence fees of CUs 
(Cocq, 2005:347). 
 
3.5 Triggers of corporatisation 
 
Apart from the need to restructure the water sector, this research observes that there are 
several other dynamics that prompted Zambia‟s water sector reforms and corporatisation in 
particular. The following sections unpack in greater detail the forces that have shaped the 
moves towards corporatised water supply and sanitation since the early 1990s.  
a. Deterioration of water services 
 
As earlier mentioned, prior to 1994, the provision of water and sanitation lay in the hands of 
local authorities in both urban and rural areas. However, by the late 1980s the local 
authorities became increasingly incapable of delivering water services particularly in urban 
areas which were marked by rapid population growth and inadequate financial investment for 
the operation and maintenance of existing water service systems (Senkwe, 2000: 4). This was 
exacerbated by the existence of crumbling infrastructure in the water service system across 
the country which was more pronounced in major cities and towns. According to the 
country‟s Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) (2006) and NWASCO (2005) the 
collapse of infrastructure was as a result of using “infrastructure installed in the 1940s meant 
to serve a population of 200 000 people and was still being used to serve a population of 
close to two million people” by the early 1990s. A study conducted by Water Aid  in 2009 
revealed that population increase without corresponding infrastructure upgrading and 
expansion coupled with reduced funding to the water sector made it impossible for local 














According to a German Technical Aid (2004) report, “low capacity, erratic payment of 
municipal workers and inability to attract skilled personnel from the labour market” ensued in 
the deterioration of water and sanitation services to the extent that some of the municipalities 
could not even provide and maintain basic level services. The rapid deterioration of water and 
sanitation services prompted the Zambian government to embark on rigorous reforms in the 
water sector. Thus corporatisation may be viewed as both a result of and solution to the 
deteriorating water and sanitation services in the country. 
 
b. Low investment levels 
 
Another factor that triggered corporatisation was the low levels of investment present in the 
water sector. This point is reiterated by Dagdeviren (2008:183) who observes that “fiscal 
concerns were the main incentives driving the reform process.” According to Bayliss (2003), 
in numerous developing countries (Zambia inclusive), the water sector is viewed as a high 
risk area and seldom profitable. Thus, the sector struggles to attract private capital 
investments. This is not a trend unique to Zambia. Most developing countries have 
experienced the same difficulties in attracting private investment and even worse, attract 
increased government funding to the water sector. Meanwhile, in countries where this private 
investment has been secured, the GTZ (2004) point out that it has been almost negligible. 
This is despite the common assertion that private sector investment in the water sector has 
been a lucrative venture in certain parts of the world (McDonald and Ruiters, 2005).  
 
 For the Zambian government in particular, it has been documented that funding to the water 
sector had been dwindling prior to corporatisation, adversely affecting local authorities as 
they battled to cope with the growing demand for water services (WSP, 2004). It is 
imperative to point out that, while the government tightened its hold on public expenditure, it 
did so unwillingly; it was dictated by the IFIs as a way to reduce budget deficits in exchange 














c. The realisation that water is an economic good 
 
The corporatisation of water services in Zambia like in many other countries is supported by 
the commodification of water which means the recognition of water as an economic good.  
This view became popular following its entrenchment in the Dublin Statement (1992, 
Principle No.4) and Agenda 21 (1992, 18.8) which acknowledged “water [as] an economic 
good, whose value should be realised through correct pricing.” This point resonates well with 
Zambia‟s 1994 National Water Policy (1994), which emphasises treating water as an 
economic good and simultaneously appreciating its social and cultural value. Further the 
predicament (in the 1990s) in the water sector, the policy argues, was instigated by poor cost 
recovery ensuing from a “perception of water as a cost-free social good rather than as an 
economic one”, and, as such, “tariffs must „reflect both the cost and true economic value of a 
commodity‟ in order to „provide the right signals‟ to consumers and bring adequate returns to 
the supplier.” Therefore, commercialisation through cost recovery is viewed as a vehicle 
through which this is supposed to be realised (Chitonge, 2011). This view is cemented by the 
realisation that water is a scarce resource that needs to be protected and utilised carefully 
especially in the light of climate change and pollution.  
 
d. Decentralisation  
 
It is also crucial to note, that the reforms in the water sector were linked to other major 
reforms the country was undergoing at that time such as the Public Sector Reform 
Programme (PSRP), which encouraged decentralisation, downsizing the civil service and 
structural adjustment measures all adopted under the auspices of the World Bank (Phiri cited 
in Cocq, 2001:11). Notably, decentralisation was not a trend only common to Zambia but the 
world over. In both the international and Zambian context, decentralisation of political and 
economic power was meant to transfer power from the centre to the periphery (local levels of 















e. Global water management trends 
 
During the same period, global water management trends like “corporatisation” of water 
services (insisted on by the World Bank, IMF and donor agencies) were sweeping the globe 
and  Zambia also came under increasing pressure to follow suit if it was to retain any 
assistance from the World Bank, IMF and other donors (Phiri cited in Cocq, 2005: 32).  
 
3.6 Summary of Chapter 3 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of Zambia‟s public service provision since 
independence. It outlines how the country was driven by nationalism and how that ultimately 
led to the poor performance of SOEs, including water utilities. It subsequently explores the 
liberalisation policies that the country introduced in a bid to remedy this and how the country 
was radical in implementing privatisation. However, privatisation did not feature in the 
country‟s water sector, instead all of the country‟s‟ urban water services were corporatised. 
The Chapter outlines various reasons why corporatisation was introduced in Zambia 
including state failure in water service delivery; low investment levels in the water sector 
coupled with deterioration in water services as a result of increased population and no 
matching expansion of the water system; and the realisation that water is an economic good.  
Another important observation is that the triggers of corporatisation in Zambia‟s water sector 
mostly emanated from within the country‟s borders, as much as there are indications of 
external influence. This Chapter sets the scene that instigators of corporatisation in Zambia 






















CHAPTER FOUR: A Critical Analysis in terms of the Improvement 
Indicators 
4.  Introduction 
 
This chapter offers a critical analysis of “corporatisation” as an option of NPM in Zambia in 
terms of the “Indicators of safe piped water services delivery improvement” as discussed 
earlier in chapter One.  
4. 1 Key performance indicators and benchmarking  
 
For the purpose of this research, the NWASCO benchmarks will be used as a scoreboard for 
progress in the Zambian water sector. Notably, these benchmarks are within the range of 
appropriate benchmarks used by other countries (World Bank, 2006). According to 
NWASCO (2010:39), benchmarking encourages competition among water service providers 
by incentivising a CU to improve its own previous performance as well as outperform the 
others. Each performance indicator discussed and analysed in this section will be 
accompanied by a corresponding benchmark table.   
 
4.2 Commercial Water Utility Clusters  
 
While this research will be taking a holistic approach to the analysis of the CUs performance, 
it is crucial to mention that the comparative performance of CUs consistently attracts 
contestations and debate due to the differing characteristics of the CUs. Markedly, the CUs 
operate under “varied conditions in terms of geographic coverage, level of economic activity 
in the area of operation, state of infrastructure and level of external support” (NWASCO, 
2010: 40). As such, the CUs are usually clustered on the basis of certain criteria such as 
“water production volumes, number of connections and population size in the service area” 
which NWASCO argues, enables comparison of performance within the same category and 
across the board. The clusters have been established for large, medium-sized and small 














Table 6: Commercial Utilities‟ Clusters 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
 
4. 3 Indicators: improvement in terms of reasonable access 
 
Table 7: NWASCO benchmark for reasonable water service coverage 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
 




















Number of connections / percentage of water services coverage by year 
 
Number of  
people per 
connection 
01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 01 10 
Lusaka 34,814 34,514 37, 252 41,145 
 
46, 152 48, 676 52, 488 71,417 
 
73, 240 76, 749 31.6 25.0 




25, 251 26, 898 36, 844 36, 901 
 
36, 206 35, 135 45, 598 41,110 
 
48,365 48, 807 16.4 13.1 




28, 601 27, 751 31, 191 23, 966 
 
73, 656 75, 364 41, 174 41,403 
 
43, 805 45, 983 16.2 15.6 
81% 92% 79% 62% 84% 85% 82% 85% 88% 90% 
 
Mulonga 18, 080 20, 984 20, 635 20, 591 
 
20, 341 21, 083 45,001 40,242 
 
41,600 43,330 13.6 10.3 
86% 91% 90% 86% 89% 91% 84% 87% 89% 90% 
 
Southern 18, 664 18, 814 
 
20, 041 21,629 23, 734 24, 461 25, 629 26, 579 29,529 31, 535 15 11.1 
49% 54% 41% 63% 82% 83% 85% 89% 89% 92% 
 
Chambeshi - - 7, 353 7, 693 
 
8, 292 9,480 12, 311 11,533 
 
12,344 14, 288 - 22.3 
- - 46% 39% 46% 47% 50% 58% 63% 66% 
 
Lukanga - - - - - 10, 610 11, 383 12,706 
 
14,360 15, 403 - 25.5 
- - - - - 40% 42% 65% 66% 66% 
Eastern 4,306 4, 659 5, 279 5, 078 
 
5,266 5, 522 5, 842 6,102 9,903 10, 316 23.7 22 
71% 71% 57% 69% 60% 59% 68% 79% 58% 65% 
 
Western 7,040 5, 606 6, 607 6 ,628 
 
6,616 7, 409 8, 155 8,339 
 
9,775 9, 257 31.4 18.1 
28% 30% 29% 47% 46% 47% 55% 57% 58% 51% 
 












Western   
36% 31% 27% 15% 62% 60% 58% 63% 69% 73% 
Luapula - - - - - - - - 3,993 
 
2, 929 - 43.4 









167543 213,053 243,322 253,387 265,661 293,796 306, 258 22.6 19.6 
simple mean 56 
 
65 59.8 61 69 66 67 73 68 70% 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
[-] no data available 
NB.: the simple mean is used instead of the median because of the absence of outliers 
 
Table 8 indicates that there has been significant improvement in the number of connections 
between 2001 and 2011 for most of the Zambian CUs. Generally, the number of connections 
rose from 182, 649 in 2001 to 306, 258 in 2011. Three CUs (Lusaka, Mulonga, and Eastern) 
in particular stand out and have more than doubled their number of connections in the period 
of reference while the rest (with an exception of the Luapula CU) have shown tremendous 
progress. This shows that there was concerted effort to increase connections to broaden the 
customer base.  
 
This translates to more people being connected to the piped water system since the start of 
corporatisation in 2000. Only Luapula has shown deterioration regarding the number of 
connections. However, it is important to note that this CU has only been in existence for 2 
years and therefore, it would be too soon to judge its performance harshly. A close 
examination of the number of connections in Table 8 reveals that of the 11 CUs, 5 had a 
small network with less than 15,000 connections in 2011. This is a far cry from the minimum 
size of efficient operation of water utilities in other developing countries estimated at 100,000 
connections (Foster, 2005). According to Chitonge (2011:8), the magnitude (small) of the 
network makes it difficult for the realisation of economies of scale for the CUs. However, 5 
CUs out of the 11 recorded over 30, 000 connections.  
 
Another factor crucial to examining the extent of coverage levels in the service area as well 
as the spread of the water network is the number of persons per connection. Table 9 further 












connections the number of people per connection is still high (from 22.6 in 2001 to 19.6 in 
2011), and indicates that perhaps the improvement made over the decade has been modest. It 
is also imperative to point out that there is no telling whether the increase in the number of 
connections to the network recorded over the past decade in Zambia‟s water sector is a result 
of expansion or merely the reconnection of once disconnected households. However, 
NWASCO (2011) argues that most CUs have embarked on database cleaning exercises over 
the more recent years in a bid to remove duplication connections.  
 
Generally table 8 suggests an upward trend in the percentage of people with service coverage 
(proportion of the population in service area with access to services) across the CUs from 
56% in 2001 to 70% in 2011.  Over the decade (2011-2011), though there has been 
stabilisation towards the 70% mean, there has been mixed progress in this regard. Seven CUs 
recorded increases in coverage levels with Lusaka, Western and North Western WSCs 
doubling their coverage ratio between 2001 and 2011. Two CUs (Eastern and Luapula) 
recorded a decline in coverage in the same period, with the latter at the bottom of the barrel 
with a mere 15%. With regards to Eastern WSCs decline in coverage ratio it is imperative to 
factor in the transformation it underwent in 2009 (from Chipata WSC to Eastern WSC) which 
resulted in the incorporation of areas formerly serviced by Local Authorities into Eastern 
WSC. 
 
Table 8 also illustrates that coverage for some CUs has been fluctuating while in some CUs, 
coverage ratios have remained fairly stable, with most CUs recording an increasing trend 
over the last 5 years. Despite this progress, table 8 also indicates that only 3 CUs (Southern 
Mulonga and Nkana WSCs) have sustained their service coverage ratio and met the 
NWASCO benchmark of 80% and above as at 2011 (NWASCO Sector report, 2011). The 
sluggish progress recorded for service coverage could be a reflection of both the rising 
population pressure and low investments for infrastructural development in the water sector. 
 
4.4 Indicators: Efficiency 
4.4.1 Unaccounted for Water 
  
Unaccounted for Water (UFW) is a measure of technical efficiency that is used for the 












of water lost in the distribution system” or the “difference between the quantity of treated 
water distributed in the network and the quantity of water that is actually billed.” UFW 
comprises technical losses (e.g. due to leakage) and commercial losses (unbilled customers, 
illegal connections and wastage on un-metered customers‟ premises) (NWASCO, 2008:36). 
While any loss of revenue is unacceptable in business, a benchmark of 25% is considered as 
an acceptable loss, according to NWASCO. This is point is reiterated in the table below.  
 
Table 9: NWASCO Benchmark for Unaccounted for Water 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
 
The table above suggests that UFW of 20% is the NWASCO benchmark for all CUs, though 





























Table 10:  Unaccounted for Water trends across Commercial Water Utilities, 2002-2011 
 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
[-] no data available 
[*] indicates that the UFW for Eastern WSC dramatically increased from 25% in 2001 to 51% in 2010 and is still reasonably 
high because of the transformation it underwent in 2009, when what used to be Chipata WSC was transformed into EWSC 
by adding areas which were formerly serviced by Local Authorities. 
 
Regarding UFW across all CUs, Table 10 reveals that there has been improvement; the 
amount of water lost has declined from an average of 51% in 2001 to 46.7% in 2011. But, in 
5 of the 11 CUs, UFW remains very high and has in some cases increased or doubled (as in 
the case of Eastern WSC with an UFW percentage of 67% in 2011). With an overall UFW 
percentage of 46.7% and in some individual cases (over 50%), about half of the water 
produced by CUs is unaccounted for. This also means that on average, CUs bill less than or 
about 50% of what they produce. This adversely affects the availability of the commodity to 












terms of cost recovery (Komives et al, 2005) and makes it problematic to realise equity 
objectives or some semblance of sustainability (Foster, 2005). 
 
A closer look at table 10 also suggests that the metering ratio improved significantly for most 
CUs over the past 10 years. In 2001 it was recorded at an average of 17.5% and it increased 
to 60% in 2011. Notably the median is used here due to the presence of outliers. Metering is 
essential for monitoring and managing water services, and it contributes significantly to the 
reduction of UFW (Komives et al., 2005). The argument this research makes is that the 
installation of prepaid meters in communities enables consumers to monitor their 
consumption and thus making it more likely for them to use water carefully. However, 
despite the doubling of metering ratio for most of the CUs between 2001 and 2011, this 
research argues that it has not led to what the CUS expected; instead the percentage of UFW 
remains very high, suggesting that perhaps there are other factors that contribute to UFW,  
such as leaking pipes due to lack of maintenance and poor infrastructure.  
 
Table 11: Collective lost revenue as a result of UFW, 2004-2011 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
US$1=K5, 181 in 2012 
 
According to Chitonge (2010) and Dagdeviren (2008) illegal connections coupled with fixed 
payments and uncollected bills are contributing factors to water wastage and unmeasured 
consumption. CU‟s annual reports and Water Sector specialists also attribute high levels of 
UFW to “vandalism, ineffective accounting and monitoring of customer databases” (AHC-
MMS, 2002, 2003; Nkana WSC, 2003). In order to appreciate the enormity of the problem 
the water losses (UFW) were translated into monetary terms, as shown in Table 11. Ideally 












Table 12 also indicates that the problem is escalating and the revenue lost on UFW is almost 
on par with, and in some cases even more than, the revenue collected from billing (i.e. in 
2004 and 2005).   
 
Given the plethora of reasons for high UFW rates, the remedies warrant a multi-faceted 
approach. However, what remains paramount to all solutions is “up-front investment in the 
renewal, maintenance and extension of the existing network [infrastructure], in metering, in 
systems of monitoring and in human resources” Dagdeviren (2008:189) argues.  This has the 
positive corollary of reducing the costs of maintenance and UFW and making better use of 
economies of scale in the sector.  
4.4.2 Number of staff per 1000 connections 
 
For the purpose of this research, the main indicator used to measure staff efficiency is the 
number of “staff per 1,000 connections or the number of employees responsible for 1000 
water connections. Comparing different CUs by means of such indicators requires some 
additional considerations. For instance, smaller CUs nd those that are spread over a larger 
region are usually not able to “realize the same economies of scale as larger companies when 
it comes to personnel cost” (NWASCO, 2011:57). It has been argued that the lower the 
number of staff per 1,000 connections, the higher the staff efficiency of the company. For 
instance, European countries like the United Kingdom or France, the norm is about 2 or 3 
staff per 1000 water connections (Bakker, 2006).  
 
Table 12:  NWASCO benchmark for staff per 1000 connections 
 
















Table 13: Number of staff employed per 1000 water connections across CUs, 2002-2011 
 
Source: Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
[1, 2, 3] cluster number 
[*] as at time of establishment 
 
According to table 13, there has generally been a decrease in the number of staff employed 
per 1000 connections across CUs in all the clusters over the period 2001-2011. It is important 
to note that in the years following corporatisation most CUs still struggled with distorted 
employee figures due to the unresolved question of seconded staff and the inclusion of casual 
workers. In 2011 all CUs with the exception of Lusaka and Luapula met the benchmark in 
their respective clusters. However, for the former, table 13 reveals a trend of failure to meet 
the benchmark since 2001 and this is despite Lusaka WSC being given a head start by being 
corporatised as early as 1989. Meanwhile, the inability of Luapula WSC to meet the 
benchmark has been attributed to the reduction in the number of water connections 













An interesting observation to make is that while the number of staff per connection has 
decreased across all CUs, the number of staff CU has generally increased since 2001 (from 
1637 to 2853) as table 13 indicates. A possible reason for this is that more staff have been 
employed to cater for the increase in the number of water connections over the decade. This 
is however, not the route envisioned for the corporatised utilities, as one of the reasons for 
establishing CUs was to ensure leaner and consequently more efficient utilities. 
 
4.5 Indicators: Service quality 
4.5.1 Quality of water 
 
The significance of water quality cannot be overemphasised given the health impact it has on 
consumers. The compliance level used by the CUs and NWASCO not only factors in the 
number of samples conducted but also in the percentage of results meeting water quality 
standards. As such, low compliance might imply deficiency in the required rigorous tests or 
“adherence to water quality standards” (NWASCO Sector Report, 2011: 47). Water is thus 
subjected to bacteriological and physiochemical tests to ensure that it is safe for human 
consumption. Thus it is no surprise that Table 14 below reveals a stringent benchmark of 
95% and above.  
 
Table 14:  NWASCO benchmark for water quality, 2001-2011 
 






















Table 15: Water Quality Compliance across CUs, 2005-2011 
 
Source: Adapted from NWASCO sector reports, 2005-20112 
 
 
According to table 15, on average there has been a modest increase in the quality of water 
supplied to consumers across the CUs from an average of 82% in 2005 to 91% in 2011. Table 
15 also reveals that over the last six years very few CUs have met, let alone sustained, the 
NWASCO benchmark of 95%. The same is true of 2011 where only Nkana, Mulonga, 
Lukanga and North Western WSCs met the NWASCO benchmark of 95%. This shows that 
the remaining CUs have recorded low compliance and consequently deficiencies in adhering 
to NWASCO‟s water quality standards. At certain times water quality has dipped to such 
dangerously and unacceptably low levels such as 8% in the case of Mulonga WSC, 10% for 
Chambeshi WSC and 13% for Western WSC in 2007.  This may have negative ramifications 
on the health of consumers of such water. However, it is imperative to note that most CUs are 
taking strides in the right direction as can be seen from table 16 where they are all moving 
towards the 91% average.   
                                                 
2 A system of monitoring the CUs’ compliance to water quality standards was only put into place in 2005 by the 
introduction of NWASCO’s water quality guideline. This obliged all CUs to not only carry out rigorous tests but also publish 












4.5.2. Hours of supply 
 
As earlier mentioned in the research, the hours of supply will be considered as another 
indicator of service quality. Below is a table that indicates the service hours that are deemed 
acceptable in the supply of water across households in Zambia. 
 
Table 16:  NWASCO Benchmark for Hours of Water Supply/Service 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
 
From the above table, it is evident that 18 hours of service is the NWASCO benchmark for all 
CUs and any number of hours below 18 is considered unacceptable.  
 
Table 17: Hours of water service per day across CUs, 2001-2011 
 
Source: Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 













Table 17 reveals that there has generally been slight progress regarding the hours of water 
supply for the CUs over the past 10 years – from an average of 14.7 hours in 2001 to 16.2 
hours in 2011. Thus, on average, service hours increased by 1.5 hours per day between 2001 
and 2011. While the table suggests this overall increment, it also indicates that there has been 
a modest convergence of most CUs towards meeting the NWASCO benchmark of 18 hours 
of supply/service per day. Out of the 11 CUs, only 4 CUs (Lusaka, Southern, Lukanga and 
North Western Water and Sewerage Companies) were able to meet the benchmark in 2011. 
Meanwhile, Western and Luapula Water and Sewerage Companies were at the bottom of the 
barrel, with the latter failing to reach even half of the NWASCO benchmark.  
 
Also noticeable is a slight deterioration over the years for 3 CUs (Kafubu, Eastern and 
Western Water and Sewerage Companies) in terms of the number of hours when water is 
available to the public. According to table 17 the above mentioned CUs recorded lower hours 
of supply in 2011 than in 2001, a year into their corporatisation. Chitonge (2011:10) raises 
the crucial observation that, it is not meaningful “to count the number of connections if the 
water connections have no water for most of the day.” Further, it is also imperative to point 
out that the reflected hours in table 17 do not take into consideration the service supply 
interruptions characteristic of low income and peri urban areas 
 
4.6 Indicators: Tariffs, collection efficiency and cost recovery 
 
Due to the fact that the above mentioned factors are inter-connected (i.e. they all determine 
the profitability and hence ability of continuity for CUs), the analysis of the effect of 
corporatisation on these factors cannot be separated. The table below shows the benchmarks 
set by NWASCO regarding Operational and Management (O&M) costs and collection 
efficiency. A CU is said to realise cost recovery if it can cover its O&M costs as much as 


















Table 18: NWASCO benchmark for coverage of O&M Costs & Collection efficiency 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
 
According to table 18, the benchmark for O&M costs as a percentage of collection efficiency 
is 100% while the benchmark for collection efficiency itself is 85%.  
 
Graph 1:  Coverage of O&M costs & levels of collection efficiency 
 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
 
Graph 1 reveals that on average, most CUs have been struggling and even unable to cover 
their O&M costs over the decade (2001-2011). Over the past 4 years however, a trend has 
emerged where an average CU has been able to cover its O&M costs. This is evidenced in the 












translates to an average CU being able to cover 105% of its O&M costs from the revenue it 
collects. This has been propelled by an increase in collection efficiency since 2001 from 54% 
to 84% in 2011. This means that most CUs are in a position to realise cost recovery, an 
objective that corporatisation advocates for.  
 
However, the tariff adjustments in graph 1 reveal that for an average CU, the ability to cover 
its O&M costs is not solely as a result of operational efficiency but an increment in water 
charges/tariffs as well. Chitonge (2011:12) holds a similar view and argues that where there 
are “noticeable efficiency gains, these gains are usually translated into a reduction in the 
O&M costs which, in turn, result in a gradual decrease in average tariffs.”  
 
Table 19: Cost of operation breakdown by percentage 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
 
However, what is apparent from table 19 is that there has been a steady increment in both 
O&M costs and the tariffs. While one may argue that water service delivery has improved 
over the decade as evidenced in the increment of hours of service, water quality and access 
among most CUs, it is not justified to assume that it warrants a yearly increment in tariffs. 
However, it is meaningful to argue that the high levels of UFW (technical losses) recorded 












of Zambia‟s population have registered discontent with the yearly increment in water tariffs, 
it has never manifested in any public protest (Chitonge, 2011:12). Suffice to say then that the 
public are content recipients of the current services. While it can be seen that corporatisation 
has led to a general improvement in cost recovery resulting from better collection rates 
among CUs, it is important to look at the individual CUs and see which ones are really 
lagging and which ones are on their way to full cost recovery. Appendix I shows the 
performance of individual CUs in this regard. 
 
While most CUs are able to achieve cost recovery through collection efficiency, it is still 
crucial to identify the areas which take up most of the revenue. According to table 19, overall 
personnel costs continued to be the highest component of O&M costs across all CUs with an 
exception of Eastern WSC which has registered a decline in the personnel costs as a 
percentage of operational costs. Nkana, Mulonga and Western, have actually doubled 
personnel associated costs. A possible reason for this is the increase in the number of staff 
over the decade as was earlier established in this research. In addition to this certain CUs, 
NWASCO (2011: 52) argues, have experienced high staff turnover which “necessitated the 
paying of terminal benefits/gratuities and recruitment of new staff,” thus the increase in 
personnel costs as a share of the O&M costs. This may have negative ramifications for 
improving water service delivery in the sense that personnel costs are catered for to the 
detriment of other areas which are paramount.  
 
4.7 Indicators: Affordability 
 
While many factors may justify the increment in tariffs, this research is particularly 
concerned with the effect that this may have on the affordability of water charges for low 
income and indigent households. A study undertaken by NWASCO (2007:34) to assess the 
impact of tariffs on Zambian households revealed that 80% of those surveyed spend on 
average 8% of their monthly household income on water and sanitation services and hence 
“water is indeed affordable for every Zambian.” This is further evidenced in the fact that 
most consumers are willing to pay much more for luxuries such as calling air time and 
alcohol than water (NWASCO, 2007:34). However, this says little about what constitutes an 













While there are numerous measures of affordability, this research adopts Chitonge‟s 
(2011:12) definition as the “share of a monthly water bill in total household 
expenditure/income.” The World Bank‟s benchmark suggests that “no households should 
spend more than 5 per cent of its monthly income on water” (World Bank, 2001). In the UK 
this figure is set at 3% (Sawkins and Dickie, 2005). Thus, a Human Development Report 
(UNDP, 2006) suggests any expenditure on water services exceeding 5% as likely to cause 
affordability problems on a household. Moreover, Komives et all (2005) add, “households 
should be able to pay for water without jeopardising their ability to pay for other goods and 
services, regardless of how much the household is willing to pay.”  
 
Table 20 below provides a clear picture of the share of water bills in the average household 
expenditure/income. While the World Health Organisations‟ (WHO) recommended basic 
consumption of water is 6m3 per month for a family of six, this research adopts 10m3 instead 
as it is reflective of “a reasonable average consumption level for an average household with 
six members in developing countries” (Howard and Bartram, 2003; Barnerjee et al., 2008). 
According to the Central Statistics Office Census 2010 report, the average household size 
estimates in Zambia is 5.1. Notably, monthly income per capita is used here instead of 
monthly household income due to the absence of updated and reliable household income 
data. The percentage of the cost of 10 m3 of water in mean monthly household 
expenditure/income is calculated by multiplying the cost of 1m3 by 10 (since this research is 
using 10 m3) and then multiplying the product by 100 per cent and dividing it further by the 
mean monthly household income as the following equation illustrates: 
 
Consumption of water as a % of household income = Cost of 1m3 x 10                     x 100%  
                                                                                    _______________________ 
                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                  Mean monthly income per capita 
 
For example for year 2009 this is equal to: 
 
 
10m3 as % of household income =     0.50 x 10         x 100 = 6.18 (rounded off to 6.2) 
 












Table 20:  Percentage of 10 m3 of water in mean monthly household /expenditure income 
 
Year  2001 2005 2009 
Cost of 1m3 (US$) 0.14 0.21 0.50 
Mean monthly income per capita (US$) 25.8 41.7 80.8 
10m3 as % of household income 5.4 5.1 6.2 
Daily per capita income 0.80 1.40 2.7 
Poverty ratio @US$ 1.25 - 64.2 - 
Poverty ratio @US$ 2 81.5 81.5 - 
 
Source: Adopted from Chitonge (2011) 
[-] No data 
 
According to table 20, the cost of 10m3 of water as a percentage of the mean monthly 
household income has increased from 5.4% in 2001 to 6.2% in 2010. This translates that in 
2001 the water bill took up 5.4% of the average monthly household expenditure/income and 
this has risen to 6.2% in 2011. Despite the steady increment in per capita income over the 
years, the significant increase in the water charges over the decade poses affordability 
challenges for even an average household. This is mainly because households in higher 
income brackets tend to spend less than their counterparts in low income brackets or indigent 
households. This is reiterated in the fact that indigent households that are not directly 
connected to the water network may pay more per unit cost of water and subsequently the 
share of the water bill may be a greater proportion of their household income (Chitonge 
2006).   
 
Further, using the US$2 per day measure as a benchmark, Table 20 also reveals that the 
income levels of over 64% of Zambian population is below the US$1.25 per day and this 
means that for many households at or below this income, the water bill of 10m3 is certainly 
higher than 5% of their monthly household income.  This generally means that the majority 
of households in Zambia are likely to face affordability challenges and particularly so 
because the state does not provide any direct subsidies to indigents. In a country like Zambia 
where poverty is widespread, the rising cost of water is particularly a pressing issue for 
consumers including government officials, even though there are no public displays of 
protest. Often times, indigent households resort to drawing water from unsafe sources such as 












water charges. While it is useful for CUs to strike a balance between improving water service 
delivery and the affordability of the services, it is crucial to point out that water charges are 
crucial to the sustainability of most CUs especially those that are unable to realise cost 
recovery due to poor collection efficiency and technical losses through UFW.  
 
From a regional perspective, the results are even more interesting. A study by Dagdeviren in 
2008 revealed that Zambia has some of the lowest water charges in Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
revelation is a possible reason why stakeholders (mostly CUs) in the water services sector 
advocate for further tariff increments. This finding presents Zambian policy makers with a 
paradox; 64% of the country‟s population find the water charges unaffordable even though the 
average tariffs are already low in comparison to other countries in the Sub-Saharan region. What 
is apparent from this situation is that any reliance on tariff increases for generating funds for 
investment across the CUs will not bring about the cost recovery or the extension of water 
services to unserved areas most CUs aspire to (Dagdeviren, 2008) 
4.8 A decade of corporatisation: developments and challenges  
 
This section of the research seeks to consolidate the data presented above by expounding a 
number of factors that need to be taken into account when constructing a score card on the 
outcome of implementing corporatisation in Zambia‟s water sector. As the previous section 
has revealed, 10 years of corporatisation has yielded not only positive developments but 
enduring challenges as well. 
 
4. 8.1 Positive Developments  
 
a. Reorganisation of the water supply services 
 
Perhaps the most prominent development corporatisation has brought about since its 
implementation is the reorganisation of water supply services. As earlier established in this 
research, prior to the 1994 reforms and subsequently corporatisation, the provision of water 
services was “clouded in uncertainty and lacking direction” (Chitonge, 2011:15). This 
stemmed from the absence of clear responsibilities allocated to institutions and consequently 












coordinate efforts aimed at fine-tuning the sectors performance. A report by the Second PRSP 
(2004) revealed the severity of this problem and argued that often times it was difficult even 
to allocate and trace funds to the sector due to the multiplicity of actors involved.  
 
Thus, corporatisation is perceived to have brought stability to the water sector through the 
establishment of Commercial Utilities which “facilitated the clarification of roles and 
functions” among the myriad of actors in the water services sector (Chitonge, 2006:9). For 
instance, as things stand, it is clear that the CUs are tasked with the provision of water 
services, the watchdog NWASCO is responsible for ensuring that the service providers (CUs) 
conform to stipulated standards and regulations, whilst the issues of policy and resource 
mobilisation for the water sector lie in the hands of the Ministry of Local Government 
(Chitonge, 2006:9; 2011:15). The extent to which these roles are fulfilled is a different 
question altogether. 
b. Improved capacity of the Commercial Utilities 
 
Corporatisation has also had a positive effect on the capacity of the CUs to meet their 
objectives. Capacity here infers the ability of CUs to provide water services as well as 
improve service levels. From the data presented above, it is evident that while most CUs have 
not met the benchmarks, they are taking strides in the right direction, e.g. increasing the 
number of people with access to water services, the reduction in UFW, an increase in the 
number of hours of water supply and increased revenue collection. 
 
Capacity also refers to the calibre of staff recruited and maintained by the CUs. A teething 
problem that CUs experienced with the exception of Eastern and Lusaka Water and Sewerage 
Companies, was that of inheriting personnel from the former employers, the Local 
Authorities. This induced a number of challenges for the CUs, for instance, the bulk of the 
council workers were not in possession of professional qualifications and seldom received 
proper skills development from their previous employer and this impacted negatively on 
efficiency (NWASCO, 2002: 8). This was exacerbated by the trend of measly and irregular 
remuneration from their employers which did little to incentivise them to work hard and 
instead instilled in them a poor work ethos (Chitonge, 2006: 17). However, over the past 10 
years there has generally been moves by CUs to adopt a professional approach to recruitment 












“frequent performance assessment of workers” (Chitonge, 2011: 15) as table 21 shows 
However, this has mostly been at the managerial level. This in turn has led to improvements 
in productivity for most of the CUs. However, this research is quick to point out that placing 
too much importance on efficiency and competence may have the negative corollary of 
overshadowing other important goals such as affordability, equity and providing services to 
poor communities.  
 
Table 21:  Capacity in terms of Personnel Qualifications 
 
Adapted from NWASCO sector reports 2001-2011 
[-] no data 
 
Another improvement in capacity is exemplified by the manner in which the CUs relate with 
the public which it serves; „an increased degree of certainty in the services offered.‟ Whilst, 
water supply interruptions are still prevalent, they are consistent in the sense that the CUs 
ensure that their customers are notified beforehand via various media including radio and 
television announcements, newspapers, fliers and sometimes mobile communication vehicles 
(Chitonge, 2011: 15). This ensures that customers are not caught unawares but can prepare 
for the service interruption by storing enough water for the day. Meanwhile, a NWACSO 
(2011:37) report revealed that the factors that continue to hamper consistent water service 
delivery and result in unplanned interruptions across the country are sometimes beyond the 












c. Depoliticisation of the water supply services 
 
Another positive development associated with corporatisation in Zambia is the reduction of 
political interference in the water sector. In order for commercialisation to flourish, first of all 
there must be an independent regulator in the sector which will subsequently promote the 
independent operation of and competition among CUs.  The regulator acts as a referee and 
ensures that the rules of the game are adhered to by both the water service providers and 
policy makers and consequently yield intended fruits. In order for the regulator to do this it 
must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy and be free from interference from politicians and 
stakeholders, a practice which was rampant prior to the reform process when the local 
authorities ran the show (GTZ, 2004). In the absence of this independence, a number of 
issues such as “licensing, tariff review procedures, settlement of disputes between providers 
and customers or among CUs, implementation of standards and monitoring compliance of 
service providers” become compromised (Chitonge, 2006: 11).  
 
The extent to which the regulator is autonomous is dependent on many factors, but perhaps 
the most important one is the source of its operational funds, whether they are derived from 
government or not.  Literatures suggest that “if operational finances for a regulator are 
sourced from government, the probability of political interference is higher than if the funds 
are sourced from outside government circles” (Chola, 2003:23). This point is reiterated in a 
study of regulatory systems in the water sectors of Sub-Saharan countries‟ which revealed 
that “in order to curb the risk of political influence, a regulatory body should not be funded 
through government institutions but instead the fees collected from the providers through a 
tariff surcharge” (GTZ, 2004).  
 
In the case of Zambia, all CUs are mandated to remit a percentage of their annual tariff 
charges in addition to their licence fee to the regulator which covers the bulk of the latter‟s 
operational costs (75%) (NWASCO, 2004b). This funding is supplemented by a small grant 
from government and donor aid. The affirmation that NWASCO has attained and maintained 
high levels of autonomy was illustrated in 2001 when it approved tariff increases a few 
months prior to general elections (GTZ, 2004: 25). However it is important to point out that 
too much autonomy comes with negative repercussions such as the inability of government to 













This aside, the autonomy of the water regulator has had positive corollaries for the 
independent operation of the CUs in Zambia. For instance, although political interference has 
not been entirely weeded out, most CUs being private companies enjoy a certain level of 
autonomy and discretion in making decisions regarding recruiting staff, what wages to pay, 
control over budgets and how to run the company (Mbilima, 2000). Furthermore, 
corporatisation has intensified the ability of water service providers to be self-sufficient and 
autonomous by virtue of being financially ring-fenced. According to Chitonge (2011:16), this 
minimum level of autonomy is crucial in ensuring that CUs desist from being involved in a 
tug-of-war by the various interest groups.  
 
4.8.2 Enduring Challenges: factors inhibiting successful corporatisation 
a. The subtle disappearance of the state in the water sector  
 
One of the major challenges that corporatisation has spawned is the vacuum created by the 
retreating state in the water sector. This is a view shared by Chitonge (2006:19) who argues 
that there has been a “subtle disappearance of the state from being the guarantor and protector 
of people‟s right of access to water.” Numerous literatures argue that by no means should the 
service providers and the regulator supplant the state in the quest to achieve equal and 
adequate access to water. In the Zambian scenario, Chitonge (2006:19) makes the interesting 
observation that the state has apparently “withdrawn behind the curtains acting as a spectator, 
watching and peeping o ce in a while to see how the CUs are managing the crisis.” Even 
though NWASCO the water regulator was established by an Act of Parliament, the only role 
government plays in the water sector is to provide guidance and mobilise resources-the latter 
which it has not been able to do diligently. The absence of the government in the water sector 
is also evident at local government level; most municipalities have adopted a wait-and-see 
approach because they are no longer responsible for providing water services. According to 
Chitonge (2006:17) some officials from the local authorities who sit on the boards of the CUs 
and have access to their annual reports claim that this is a sufficient contribution from them.   
 













The subtle disappearance of the state from the water sector is further evident and exacerbated 
by the funding gap that has emerged in Zambia‟s water sector.  This has created a multitude 
of problems, particularly low investments and the speedy deterioration of infrastructure. One 
of the reasons why CUs have been unable to increase their production capacity to match the 
growing demand is the lack of sufficient funds. This is further exacerbated by the fact that 
most CUs are barely meeting their Operational and Maintenance costs as well as making a 
profit as the data in the previous section has shown. The regulator NWASCO (2011) shares 
this view and identifies the lack of capital investment as being a major impediment to the 
development of the water services sector. This point ties in with a view brought up earlier in 
the research concerning the source of funding to the water services sector, with government 
only providing less than 10% of the total expenditure of the sector (Water Aid Zambia, 
2009). A more recent report confirms this and indicates that investments in the sector by the 
government have been low, with allocations in the National Budget of less than 3% of the 
total (NWASCO, 2011:12).  
 
 From this viewpoint, corporatisation has in some subtle way led to the states abrogation of 
its responsibilities. It is evident that a more aggressive funding model is urgently needed in 
Zambia‟s water services sector if the modest successes recorded over the past 10 years are to 
be sustained and improved on. Clearly, the state should not narrow its role to mobilising 
resources, but also play an active role in ensuring that the CUs work towards achieving the 
set objectives for the reforms, especially extending coverage to unserved communities. 
 
c. Crumbling infrastructure   
 
The establishment of CUs occurred at a time when Local Authorities were experiencing 
operational and sustainability problems. Unfortunately, when CUs took over the provision of 
water services they inherited a plethora of problems that were inherent in the old system. One 
of the biggest problems inherited was that of crumbling infrastructure. Generally, the 
infrastructure handed over to CUs by LAs was built between the 1960s-1970s [over 40 years 
ago on average] with little or no renovation or upgrading (Kazembe, 2003:17). Dagdeviren 
(2008) points out that even though donor grants or loans were provided to some CUs at the 
beginning of the corporatisation process they were not sufficient to fully rehabilitate the 












by the German Technical Development organization, GTZ. This explains why Chipata had 
the lowest UFW (26%) among the CUs in 2006 (NWASCO, 2006).  
 
Even NWASCO (2011:66) acknowledges the severity of the problem and claims that major 
investment in infrastructure continues to elude the water supply sector. With the present state 
of affairs of decaying infrastructure in most of the CUs, colossal investments are required in 
the sector to improve the performance of the CUs. The current infrastructure capacities have 
been exceeded and the need for new investment is heightened by the growing demand due to 
a growing urban population and or the mushrooming of new development areas in all major 
towns with no corresponding level of service provision (NWASCO 2011:66). For instance, 
according to the Zambia Census Report of 2010, the country has registered population growth 
over the past 10 years (from 9.8million in 2000 to 13million in 2010) and the majority of this 
population dwell in urban areas. Moreover, while corporatisation has propelled a clear 
institutional set-up in the water sector, there is inadequate consultation and co-ordination 
among stakeholders when it comes to land development and as a result consumers are not at 
the receiving end of satisfactory services in new development areas. According to a 
NWASCO Sector report (2011:31) “allocating land without first providing services has 
resulted in planning in retrospect” and the CUs still do not have readily available investment 
funds to meet the current demand for services.  
 
The existence of weak or inadequate legal and institutional frameworks, a situation which 
does not generally stimulate private investment is another major challenge. Particularly the 
government, has not led by example, for instance despite being a “major consumer of water 
and sanitation services, it defaults in settling bills at will” (OECD, 2012:113). However, 
government has recognized the need to address the deficits in infrastructure development by 
reinforcing public management and financial accountability amongst the Ministries and 
Spending Agencies. Furthermore, the Government has put in place a deliberate public 
investment policy for the water and sanitation sector so as to increase funding and address the 
undercapitalisation of CUs (OECD, 2012:113). Despite the good intentions corporatisation may 
have they can prove futile in the absence of financial resources for investment in the 













d. Reluctance to extend services to Low Income Areas and vulnerability of the poor 
  
It has also been revealed that there is a tendency for CUs throughout the country to focus on 
servicing the high income neighbourhoods at the expense of peri-urban and low income 
areas, which have remained the “areas beyond the cities network‟ (Chitonge, 2011:16). 
Dagdeviren (2008) argues that most CUs are reluctant to extend their services to the latter 
based on the premise that they are “unprofitable due to low collections and payment levels,” 
and Chitonge (2007) adds that the “risks of vandalism and default are high while 
consumption volumes are too low”. This is not a situation unique to Zambia; there has been a 
common trend for private or commercial water companies to shun poor communities (Hall 
and Lobina, 2006; Marin et al., 2010; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005).  
 
As such, in the Zambian case it has been challenging to persuade the CUs that it is their duty 
to ensure that residents of such areas are recipients of clean and adequate water (DTF, 2005). 
This is despite the Devolution Trust Fund (DTF) providing incentives for service providers to 
enable them to become interested in extending their water services to peri-urban and low 
income areas. Prior to corporatisation when the LAs provided water services to these areas, 
they did not do so on the basis of the profitability of such an exercise but as a social 
responsibility. On the contrary, Chitonge (2006:17) argues, for CUs “the profit aspect has to 
be factored into the decision to provide service to low income areas.” This has ultimately led 
to acute disparities in the level and quality of service between high income areas and low 
income areas. This point is further reiterated in NWASCO‟s customer complaint database 
which indicates that residents from low income areas claimed that they were treated like 
second class citizens. For instance, employees of water service providers respond promptly to 
complaints from high income areas, while the response to complaints from low income areas 
is very slow, if any. Also, employees of water service providers‟ tend to be less lenient with 
them when it comes to disconnection, compared to customers in high income areas 
(Chitonge, 2011:17). 
The introduction of CUs has also increased the vulnerability of indigent households to 
exploitation and they often find it hard to afford water services. The CUs shunning of poor 
communities has resulted in indigent households buying water from their neighbours or 
unscrupulous tap owners often at exorbitant prices per unit than those connected to the 












with communal taps face an equally unique problem such as that most tap attendants only sell 
water up to 6 pm after which the taps are closed and those knocking off from work late are 
forced to buy water from their neighbours often at twice the cost or more of the water sold at 
communal taps or water kiosks (Chitonge, 2006:17). Thus corporatisation has prompted the 
exploitation of indigent households by their neighbours, vendors or tap attendants and made it 
difficult for them to access this basic right, water.  
 
This raises the fundamental point that the establishment of these CUs (one in each province, 
except for the Copperbelt which has three) has created monopoly is terms of service 
provision and customers who cannot afford the water charges are merely disconnected from 
the water network as the CUs are not in the business of wooing clients as it is the case when 
services providers compete for the loyalty of customers.  
 
e. The Missing Link: Indigence Policy 
 
The reluctance of most CUs to extend services to poor communities is further aggravated by 
the absence of an indigence policy in Zambia‟s water sector.  Following corporatisation, a 
number of social welfare programmes aimed at alleviating discrepancies in water services by 
meeting the needs of the vulnerable in communities (senior citizens, the physically 
challenged, orphans, widows, child-headed families) disappeared. These vulnerable groups 
may not always have money to buy water even at K50 ($0.009) per 20 litre container. 
According to Chitonge (2006), previously these vulnerable groups fell under the umbrella of 
the social welfare programmes under the Ministry of Community Development and Social 
Services. However, following corporatisation this is an entirely different story; the CUs 
instead are believed to have incorporated this service. However, there has been no evidence 
of the CUs upholding their end of the bargain. South Africa for instance, has a water lifeline 
policy that ensures that indigent households are served with 6 kilolitres of water for free 
every month (commonly known as Free Basic Water). However, if they consume more than 6 
kilolitres,   they still need to pay. This is not to say that there has been no concerted effort by 
the Zambian government to make water accessible to all. There have been moves to create a 
successful approach to water service provision for the poor through the establishment of 
Kiosk Systems which serve to mitigate the vulnerability of the poor. These systems are the 












under the purview of NWASCO and International donors. The arrangement in place is that 
the CUs provide bulk water to water vendors who sell it in peri-urban areas or areas beyond 
the water networks. However, no amount of water is given for free at all.  
 
4. 9 Summary of Chapter 4 
 
Chapter Four is a critical analysis of “corporatisation” as an option of NPM in Zambia in 
terms of the “Indicators of safe piped water services delivery improvement.” Some of the 
indicators include the reduction in UFW, increased access to water, increase in the number of 
hours water is supplied to consumers, affordability of water charges and the number of staff 
per 1000 connections.  
 
This research established a number of trends across the CUs concerning the performance 
indicators mentioned. For instance, there was an improvement in UFW albeit, slightly. In 
2001 it stood at 51% and in 2011 at 46.7%. This is despite the increase in metering ratio over 
the decade. Thus, the high level of UFW may be attributed to not only leaking pipes and 
vandalism but also unmeasured consumption, illegal connections and uncollected bills. In 
terms of increased access to water, this research has established that most CUs have recorded 
successes over the decade. However, much still needs to be done to ensure that the service is 
extended to unserved areas. With regards to the number of staff employed, the analysis above 
revealed a reduction across CUs in all clusters but it is crucial to note that the number of 
employees‟ in each CU has increased over the years. This may have negative consequences 
for the efficiency of the CUs.  
 
Water quality across all CUs also seems to have improved on average from 82% in 2005 to 
91% in 2011. It is crucial to mention that more measures have to be put in place to ensure that 
all CUs improve water quality as it has a bearing on the health of consumers. Regarding the 
number of hours water is made available to the public, there been slight progress over the 
decade from an average of 14.7 hours in 2001 to 16.2 hours in 2011. However, there has been 
a modest convergence of most CUs towards meeting the NWASCO benchmark of 18 hours 
of supply/service per day. Furthermore, although most CUs initially struggled with raising 
their collection efficiency the past 4 years have registered improvement. This resulted in most 












affordability, this research established that a significant proportion of Zambia‟s population 
cannot afford water charges as the water bill takes up at least 6.2% of the mean household 
monthly income/expenditure. As such most indigent households have resorted to unsafe 
water sources.  
 
Chapter Four has also discussed some of the enduring challenges the CUs have faced which 
include the lack of infrastructural investment which has precipitated the decay of 
infrastructure and the inability of CUs to extend their services to unserved areas. Other 
challenges include the disappearance of the state in the water sector, the reluctance of CUs to 
extend their services to low income communities, increased vulnerability of the poor and the 
































CHAPTER FIVE: Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
5.  Summary of Findings 
 
The main objective of this research was to assess whether the corporatisation of urban water 
services improved water service delivery in Zambia. This research begins by discussing the 
evolution of State Owned Enterprises including their failures which led to the emergence of 
neo-liberal models of service delivery under the umbrella of the New Public Management 
doctrine. The research also highlights the shift from privatisation as a dominant reform 
strategy and option for public service delivery to corporatisation as a result of the numerous 
negative experiences the former leaves in its wake. Specific emphasis has been placed on the 
forces at play in African countries as well as the role of IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF 
in promoting corporatisation. The research has also explored, albeit not in depth, the effect of 
corporatisation on water service delivery in countries where it has been implemented.    
 
On a more specific note, the research focused on the reforms and consequently 
corporatisation of Zambia‟s urban water services which were prompted by the proliferation of 
the NPM trends in the Sub-Saharan countries in the early 2000s. The research established that 
the Zambian government came under increasing pressure from the World Bank and other IFIs 
to commercialize its urban water services in exchange for debt relief and continued financial 
support. This research also identified a plethora of internal factors that prompted 
corporatisation such as the disarray in the water sector, the inability of Local Authorities to 
extend water service provision to meet the increasing demand, crumbling and ageing 
infrastructure which led to excessive losses in terms of leakages and the inability of LAs to 
realise cost recovery. The implementation of corporatisation was thus seen as a panacea to 
the aforementioned problems.  
 
The question this research sought to answer was whether the corporatisation of urban water 
services has improved water service delivery in Zambia since its introduction in 2000. While 
Lusaka and Eastern Water and Sewerage Companies were corporatised way before 2000, the 
datasets used throughout this research range from 2001-2011 due to the lack of adequate and 
reliable data prior to the period of reference. Furthermore, the period of reference coincides 
with the proliferation of NPM principles such as corporatisation and privatisation in the water 












selection of some key performance indicators of safe piped water services delivery 
improvement which included; increased access for people who were not previously 
connected to the water network, the reduction in Unaccounted For Water (UFW), the 
reduction in the number of staff employed per 1000 connections, the increase in the quality of 
water, the increase in the number of hours of water supply and the affordability of water 
charges (tariffs).  
 
A critical analysis of the corporatisation of Zambia‟s urban water services over the decade 
(2001-2011) reveals that there have been both positive outcomes and enduring challenges. 
Some of the positive outcomes of corporatisation include the reorganisation of Zambia‟s 
water sector where the myriad of key institutions/actors in the sector have clear roles and 
functions, the depoliticisation of the water supply services, improved capacity of the CUs and 
their staff and stability and consistency of services. These positive achievements have 
manifested themselves in terms of improved performance indicators such as increased water 
connections, consistent water supply, increased metering ratios, systematic and credible 
billing and accessible pay points. However, these positive achievements have been 
concentrated to high-income areas while low-income areas have recorded minute 
improvements. Moreover, most of the positive outcomes have been diluted by the modest 
progress recorded on fundamental performance indicators such as water service coverage, 
hours of supply and UFW. Accordingly, on one hand the aftermath of corporatisation is 
associated with modest progress in the core service areas such as the expansion of the water 
network and availability of services while on the other hand it has recorded success in areas 
related to Operations and Management (O&M). 
 
Following are the findings:   
 
With regards to the accessibility of safe piped water in Zambia, this research has established 
that the number of people who have access to this basic need has been increasing since the 
commencement of corporatisation. For instance, the access to safe piped water in Zambia 
increased from 56% in 2011 to 70% in 2011. %).  The research also reveals that the number 
of connections to the water network has increased tremendously and almost doubled during 
the period of reference, from 164, 569 connections to 306,258. This increase is about 20% on 
average (i.e. 76%-56%=20%).  However, this research has also considered it plausible that 












corporatised water utilities. It could have been as a result of the reconnection of previously 
disconnected households. As such, if Zambia is to meet the UN MDGs goal of halving the 
number of people without access to water by 2015, it has to make more concerted efforts to 
reach this goal. 
 
In terms of reducing the levels of UFW by the corporatised water utilities, this research has 
established that generally there has been an improvement in UFW (reduction from an average 
of 51% in 2001 to 46.7% in 2011). However, this achievement is modest as among the 11 
CUs, UFW remains dangerously high and in some cases it even increased or doubled. This 
translates to about half of the water produced by CUs not only wasted but unbilled, which in 
turn has significant repercussions for the CUs in terms of cost recovery. Notably, most CUs 
have resorted to metering to alleviate the problem but the high levels of UFW indicate that 
perhaps there are other factors that add to UFW, such as leaking pipes due to crumbling 
infrastructure, unmeasured consumption as a result of illegal connections and vandalism.  
 
In terms of reducing the number of staff employed per 1000 connections, this research has 
found that CUs in all clusters have recorded a slight decrease over the decade (2001-2011). 
Following the commencement of corporatisation, most CUs struggled with reducing the 
number of staff employed per 1000 connections as they were burdened with seconded staff 
they had inherited from their precursors, the Local Authorities.  As of 2011, only Lusaka 
WSC exhibited consistent failure to adhere to the benchmarks set by NWASCO regarding the 
number of staff employed per 1000 connections.   
 
With regards to hours of supply, this research has established that there has been slight 
progress for the CUs over the decade evidenced by an increase in the national average from 
14.7% in 2001 to 16.2% in 2011. However, this is not to say that all CUs are meeting the set 
benchmark of 18 hours per day. Others still have recorded a decline in the number of hours of 
water services. A crucial point to raise here is that the number of hour‟s water services are 
made available to the public is very crucial and perhaps it is not meaningful to count the 
number of connections at all if the customers do not have access to water for most of the day. 
Added to this is the argument that the data presented in this research does not account for the 
water service interruptions typical of low income areas. That aside, this research has 
established that the problem of erratic supply has been minimised by ensuring that all 













In terms of water quality, this research has found that most CUs have increased the quality of 
water supplied to consumers, albeit slightly. Over the decade, water quality has risen from an 
average of 82% in 2005 to 91% in 2011. However, over the past six years only a handful of 
CUs have sustained the NWASCO benchmark of 95%. This means that the majority of CUs 
have displayed low compliance and deficiencies in meeting the acceptable water quality 
standards, with two CUs, for instance, recording levels as low as 8% and 13% in 2007.  This 
may have serious repercussions for the health of the consumers, with the heightened 
likelihood of contracting waterborne diseases such as cholera and dysentery.   
 
This research also established that on average CUs were struggling to stay afloat as a result of 
modest collection efficiency. This is evidenced in their inability to cover their O&M costs 
over the decade and consequently realise cost recovery. However, over the past 4 years a 
trend has emerged where collection efficiency has been rising and an average CU has been 
able to cover its O&M costs and consequently realise cost recovery. While this has been the 
case, this research has also established that the ability of an average CU to cover its O&M 
costs is not only as a result of operation efficiency but also due to an increment in water 
charges/tariffs over the years. What is unclear is whether the improvements recorded in the 
water services sector such as increased hours of service and water quality; to mention a few, 
warrant the increment in tariffs over the years. However, whatever efficiency gains the 
average CU makes; these are undermined by some of the technical losses e.g. the high rate of 
UFW.  
 
With regards to affordability, this research established that a significant proportion of 
Zambia‟s population cannot afford the water charges. This comes as no surprise given the 
widespread nature of poverty in the country with more than 64% living on less than US$1.25 
per day. The cost of 10m3 of water as a percentage of the mean monthly household income 
has increased from 5.4% in 2001 to 6.2% in 2010 and this is higher than the 5% benchmark 
recommended by the WHO. The consistent increment in tariffs further exacerbates the 
situation. However, it is crucial to note that because CUs on average have merely met the set 
collection efficiency benchmarks, their operation and maintenance costs are jeopardised if 
they do not make up for it in tariff increments. Thus tariff increments are necessary to realise 












technical losses i.e. UFW. However any reliance on tariffs alone to improve water service 
delivery is a far fetched idea. 
 
In terms of the challenges prompted by and inhibiting the implementation of corporatisation 
over the past decade, the subtle disappearance of the State in the water sector, dwindling 
infrastructural investment coupled with crumbling and ageing infrastructure, reluctance to 
extend services to low income areas, the increasing vulnerability of the poor as a result of the 
growing affordability burden, inability to meet growing demand for water services 
commensurate with population growth, stand out. Other factors that have inhibited the 
realisation of the objectives set out in the corporatisation process are manifested in the CUs 
inability to expand the water network to unserved areas (peri-urban and rural areas), abrupt 
water service interruption, and unresponsiveness to customer complaints, defective house 
connections, wrong billing and the denigrating attitude of CU employees targeted at residents 
of low-income areas.  
 
Another concern is the lack of commitment exhibited by the state in the funding of the water 
services sector. It is important to note that a consistent critique of the CUs as water service 
providers infers a retreat to the state actually providing the services to the people. This is not 
the view this research is championing, instead it argues that the state should put in place 
proper monitoring mechanisms and provide oversight to ensure that all its citizens have 
access to this human right (water). Providing adequate infrastructural capital to maintain and 
expand the existing network is one way of guaranteeing this. Further, more energy needs to 
be channelled into incentivising CUs to extend their water services to the residents in the 
peripheries of the towns they serve. 
 
In conclusion, as the above summary of findings reveal, the corporatisation of urban water 
services has marginally improved water service delivery although problems of affordability 
still exist. However, it is imperative to note that a number of factors have also influenced the 
observed achievements as has been established above such as the donor funding that has been 














5.1 Some areas of future research 
 
Based on the findings of this research, the following gaps were identified as areas for future 
research.  
 As this research takes a holistic approach on the performance of the CUs in Zambia, 
future research can be done to find out just how much individual CUs have changed 
in their day to day operation. This should target areas such as capacity building 
among the staff as well as what technology the various CUs have adopted over the 
period under corporatisation. 
 Related to the above gap, a potential area of research would be the performance of 
private schemes.  
 It would also be important to research the effect of the CUs‟ performance and the 
growth of investment in their operating areas as one of the important components for 
how a city/town tends to attract investment in manufacturing is its ability to provide 
utility services such as water and electricity to industries. 
 Future researches should endeavour to compare the effect of corporatisation among 
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Year Cost recovery (%) 
Collection 
efficiency (%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 76% 66% 25% 
2003/4 76% 80% 0% 
2004/5 74% 77% 0% 
2005/6 84% 81% 60% 
2006/7 102% 83% 63% 
2007/8 111% 95% 0% 
2008/09 91% 73% 15% 
2009/10 106% 80% 27% 
 
Southern Water 
Year Cost recovery (%) 
Collection 
efficiency (%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 68% 48% 0% 
2003/4 54% 49% 0% 
2004/5 65% 57% 0% 
2005/6 78% 90% 0% 
2006/7 93% 102% 33% 
2007/8 104% 108% 17% 
2008/09 113% 121% 14% 
2009/10 106% 96% 9% 
 
Mulonga 
Year Cost recovery (%) 
Collection 
efficiency (%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 50% 39% 0% 
2003/4 52% 52% 0% 
2004/5 59% 58% 70% 
2005/6 89% 59% 18% 
2006/7 94% 64% 25% 
2007/8 111% 77% 4% 
2008/09 134% 89% 8% 
2009/10 136% 93% 0% 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The data for 2001 and 2011 is absent as the data present was on overall performance. The same goes for the 













Year Cost recovery (%) Collection (%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 50% 52% 60% 
2003/4 68% 63% 0% 
2004/5 76% 81% 0% 
2005/6 84% 78% 25% 
2006/7 103% 80% 20% 
2007/8 105% 88% 8% 
2008/09 78% 63% 15% 
2009/10 92% 77% 0% 
 
Kafubu 
Year Cost recovery (%) Collection (%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 45% 30% 60% 
2003/4 63% 52% 0% 
2004/5 95% 65% 6% 
2005/6 109% 58% 6% 
2006/7 114% 85% 22% 
2007/8 128% 96% 14% 
2008/09 60% 68% 12% 
2009/10 104% 73% 7% 
 
Western 
Year Cost recovery (%) 
Collection 
efficiency  
(%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 81% 73% 0% 
2003/4 64% 94% 0% 
2004/5 61% 76% 55% 
2005/6 69% 90% 0% 
2006/7 86% 108% 53% 
2007/8 78% 82% 0% 
2008/09 71% 81% 0% 
2009/10 90% 96% 0% 
 
North-Western 
Year Cost recovery (%) 
Collection 
efficiency  
(%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 50% 108% 0% 
2003/4 45% 97% 67% 
2004/5 52% 94% 180% 
2005/6 67% 87% 0% 
2006/7 90% 85% 39% 












2008/09 104% 88% 28% 
2009/10 85% 103% 3% 
 
Eastern  
Year Cost recovery (%) 
Collection 
efficiency (%) Change in Tariff (%) 
2002/3 50% 47% 42% 
2003/4 84% 78% 0% 
2004/5 79% 81% 0% 
2005/6 99% 83% 0% 
2006/7 114% 121% 0% 
2007/8 82% 108% 0% 
2008/09 76% 76% 35% 
2009/10 72% 91% 10% 
 
  
 
 
 
